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Attractive store format, robust model, smart use of capital 
DIA is a Spanish based convenience discount player in the food retail 
market. It operates more than 6.700 stores in five countries, including 
Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Argentina and China.  
A low cost operator who seek profitable growth… The story of 
DIA is based on margins, cutting costs, margins, efficiencies and 
more margins… Its profit driven management team has been able to 
cut losses and improved EBITDA margins by 120bp since 2010 and it 
is expected to improve another 90bp due to the sale of DIA France in 
2014. This was only possible due to a mix of three factors: divestment 
of loss making operations (Beijing, Turkey and France); continuous 
search for operational efficiencies; and higher contribution of 
franchisees.  
The concept of the future: Price, Proximity… The current world 
trends, ageing population and lower income in developed countries, 
and the rise of a modernized middle class and decrease in poverty in 
emerging markets, favor both price and proximity attributes. 
Moreover, people became more price sensitive and no longer want to 
go to a hypermarket and make a “one-stop shopping”.  
…Franchise... Furthermore, due to its risk/profit sharing 
characteristic, franchising is becoming desirable, combining the 
financial strength and know-how of a big retailer with the 
personalized service and local expertise of the entrepreneur.  
…Online. Finally, alternative channels, such as online and the “click 
and collect” system, are gaining market share, especially in non food 
products. Currently DIA has a website and a mobile app, in Spain, 
where customers can order online and pick up their groceries at one of 
the more than 4.150 locations available. 
Private label products, what else? In order to be truly low price and 
be able to offer “quality at affordable prices” and “value for money” 
products, soon DIA started to developed private label brands. This 
way the company not only managed to offer quality products at very 
competitive prices but created a competitive advantage and a loyalty 
factor.  
 
Target Price: €7,6 
Closing Price (Dec 31, 2014): €5,6  
Potential Upside: 36% 
Market capitalization (€M): 3 274            
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Performance 2012 2013 2014
DIA 37,6% 35,1% -13,4%
IBEX 35 -4,7% 21,4% 3,7%
Food retail index -7,1% 15,6% -17,1%
Source: Bloomberg 
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Iberia 
The light at the end of the tunnel vs the cloud rising… Europe in 
general and Iberia in particular have been suffering from austerity 
and sluggish growth since the 2008 financial crisis. The economy is 
finally giving signs of recovery with unemployment declining in 
2013 and GDP growth to be expected in 2014. However, government 
debt is still at alarming levels and food retailers face another threat: 
Deflation. Iberia was hit by a deflationary pressure, especially in 
food products dragging retailers down. Although it is expected 
inflation to be fueled by the increase of private demand, world 
institutions have already alerted for the risk of entering in a 
deflationary spiral.  
Bye Bye France… As a response to the world’s weak 
macroeconomic performance many retailers had to downsize their 
portfolios to focus on core businesses. DIA wasn’t the exception and 
after the successful exit from Beijing and Turkish loss making 
operations, the company managed to sell its French deteriorating 
activity for €600 million to its former “parent” Carrefour.  
…Welcome El Árbol and Eroski. In contrast, DIA is using almost 
half of the proceeds from the sale to acquire assets in the Spanish 
fragmented market. In this context the company bought 444 El Árbol 
stores and 160 Eroski stores. In total, acquisitions are expected to 
increase DIA’s 2015 sales by more than €1.100 million. Moreover, 
these acquisitions are expected to carry significant synergies: on one 
hand, DIA’s low cost and extremely efficient operating model, applied 
to the new stores, would make them boost profitability by reducing 
logistic and administrative costs and improving buying conditions; on 
the other hand, DIA will increase its market share and take advantage 
of El Árbol’s know how in perishables and fresh food. 
The source of diversification: Clarel. The acquisition of Shlecker’s 
stores in Iberia, in 2013, opened the door for DIA to diversify its 
portfolio to home and personal care. This way the company not only 
started a new source of growth but also managed to improve the home 
and personal care assortment in DIA’s banner stores. Moreover, the 
company is currently remodeling Shlecker stores to a new banner: 
Clarel. A more modernize and with a better offer store. Furthermore, 
the €70,5 million investment made the number of stores to increase by 
1.130 and around €241 million in sales. Additionally, Clarel stores are 
expected to have high EBITDA margins: 10%. 
To summarize: DIA manages an extremely profitable store network 
in Iberia with increasing EBITDA margin even in a deflationary 
environment. However, the company is now facing deflation and high 
levels competition in Portugal. These two effects pressured sales and 
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Source: Company data & OECD 
Source: Company data & Carrefour 
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Mercadona Pingo doce Sonae MC DIA Iberia
El Árbol Eroski
Amount invested (1) 125 146
Number of stores (2) 444 160
Net sales in 2013 (1) 825 443
EBITDA margin in 2013 (3) -0,6% 3,0%
Average selling area (Sqm) 700 800
Total area (Sqm) 310 800 128 000
Sales per Sqm 2 654 3 459
EV/Sales multiple 0,15 0,33
(1) In Mill ion Euros
(2) Eroski stores are subject of adjustments
(3) Estimatimations
Sqm = Square meters
Source: Company data and own 
estimations 
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Negative scenarios were constructed. In order to incorporate the risk of a macroeconomic 
slowdown on the valuation, a scenario of deep deflation in Iberia and another of hyperinflation 




Not so emerging after all? Although carrying additional risks, 
emerging markets have the fame of being good sources of 
growth and opportunities. For instance, countries like 
Argentina and Brazil experienced a fast recovery from the 
2008 financial crisis and China “almost didn’t fell it”. However 
these countries are currently facing headwinds. Argentina and, 
although with lesser extent, Brazil, are witnessing high 
inflation and negative GDP growth and the Chinese GDP is 










€ million 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Sales 5 117 5 284 5 106 5 953 6 142 6 166 6 165 6 176 6 194 6 226 6 259 6 305 6 340
of which Spain 4 317 4 293 4 152 5 008 5 195 5 206 5 193 5 191 5 195 5 211 5 226 5 252 5 279
of which Portugal 800 749 693 657 642 637 631 627 628 630 632 635 638
of which Clarel 0 241 261 288 306 324 341 358 371 386 401 417 424
EBITDA 457 505 495 474 489 502 512 530 553 573 588 597 603
EBITDA margin (%) 8,9% 9,6% 9,7% 8,0% 8,0% 8,1% 8,3% 8,6% 8,9% 9,2% 9,4% 9,5% 9,5%
EBIT 300 352 335 304 303 314 321 337 359 378 393 402 407
Capex 157 152 190 366 221 216 216 210 204 202 200 195 196
Changes in working capital 12 0 -50 86 19 2 0 1 2 3 3 4 4
Free cash flow 155 108 211 210 216 237 260 279 293 306 309
Base Scenario
€ million 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Sales 5 117 5 284 5 084 5 787 5 457 5 298 5 216 5 183 5 178 5 182 5 194 5 218 5 248
of which Spain 4 317 4 293 4 131 4 714 4 589 4 444 4 362 4 322 4 304 4 296 4 296 4 304 4 326
of which Portugal 800 749 692 614 569 539 524 517 517 517 517 518 521
of which Clarel 0 241 261 283 299 315 329 344 356 369 382 396 402
EBITDA 457 505 493 340 299 304 309 337 372 388 421 437 444
EBITDA margin (%) 8,9% 9,6% 9,7% 5,9% 5,5% 5,7% 5,9% 6,5% 7,2% 7,5% 8,1% 8,4% 8,5%
EBIT 300 352 333 170 113 115 119 144 178 193 226 241 248
Capex 133 187 190 366 221 216 216 210 204 202 200 195 196
Changes in working capital 12 0 -52 77 -29 -16 -8 -3 -1 0 1 2 3
Free cash flow 151 3 21 43 56 87 122 138 166 184 189
Deflationary Scenario
€ million 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Sales 5 117 5 284 5 100 5 912 5 971 5 949 5 928 5 928 5 940 5 965 5 993 6 033 6 067
of which Spain 4 317 4 293 4 147 4 935 5 043 5 015 4 985 4 974 4 972 4 982 4 994 5 015 5 040
of which Portugal 800 749 693 646 624 612 604 600 600 602 603 606 609
of which Clarel 0 241 261 287 304 322 338 354 367 382 396 412 418
EBITDA 457 505 494 440 441 453 461 482 507 526 546 557 563
EBITDA margin (%) 8,9% 9,6% 9,7% 7,5% 7,4% 7,6% 7,8% 8,1% 8,5% 8,8% 9,1% 9,2% 9,3%
EBIT 300 352 334 271 256 264 271 289 313 332 351 361 367
Capex 133 187 190 366 221 216 216 210 204 202 200 195 196
Changes in working capital 12 0 -50 83 7 -2 -2 0 1 2 3 4 3
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LFL Emerging markets DIA LFL Latin America Carrefour
LFL Latin America Casino
Source: Company data 
Perpetual Growth 0,6%
Wacc 5,8%
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FX can be devastating. The macroeconomic uncertainty lived in 
Argentina and Brazil has an extremely negative impact on the 
perceived risk of the country. As a consequence the local currencies 
have been devaluating at a fast pace. Especially in Argentina, 
where sales during the first nine months of 2014, despite an 
increase of 54% in constant rates, decreased by 1,7% in Euro terms.  
Any way… Emerging markets will still provide good sources of 
growth! Despite of the recent deterioration of some emerging 
economies it is still expected these countries to outperform 
developed countries in terms of growth. Even though the difficult 
macroeconomic environment, DIA is growing above inflation in 
Argentina with very healthy LFL. Therefore, the company is 
expected to continue investing in these countries. It is also 
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Emerging markets stores evolution
448 495 559 643 720
807 903 994 1 093
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Argentina Brazil China
€ million 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Sales 2 450 2 662 2 732 2 661 2 607 2 732 2 975 3 243 3 440 3 610 3 744 3 856 3 933
of which Argentina 952 1 052 1 058 1 015 975 975 1 064 1 173 1 263 1 329 1 382 1 424 1 452
of which Brazil 1 351 1 441 1 498 1 468 1 454 1 566 1 702 1 850 1 946 2 038 2 109 2 172 2 216
of which China 148 169 176 177 178 192 209 220 231 243 253 260 266
EBITDA 65 77 82 64 65 77 89 104 114 126 139 154 165
EBITDA margin (%) 2,7% 2,9% 3,0% 2,4% 2,5% 2,8% 3,0% 3,2% 3,3% 3,5% 3,7% 4,0% 4,2%
EBIT 33 40 42 11 6 12 19 27 31 39 48 61 70
Capex 106 128 135 125 125 137 152 156 141 130 124 120 96
Changes in working capital -45 -14 9 6 5 -12 -24 -27 -20 -17 -13 -11 -8
Free cash flow -76 -71 -67 -52 -45 -34 -18 0 13 26 54
Hyperinflation and Recession Scenario
€ million 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Sales 2 450 2 662 2 732 2 953 3 269 3 609 3 927 4 235 4 506 4 767 4 958 5 106 5 208
of which Argentina 952 1 052 1 058 1 089 1 182 1 273 1 371 1 442 1 517 1 596 1 660 1 710 1 744
of which Brazil 1 351 1 441 1 498 1 666 1 866 2 094 2 297 2 520 2 701 2 869 2 983 3 073 3 134
of which China 148 169 176 197 221 242 260 273 287 302 314 324 330
EBITDA 65 77 82 92 105 119 134 148 171 191 208 230 232
EBITDA margin (%) 2,7% 2,9% 3,0% 3,1% 3,2% 3,3% 3,4% 3,5% 3,8% 4,0% 4,2% 4,5% 4,5%
EBIT 33 40 42 38 43 50 57 66 83 98 111 129 130
Capex 106 128 135 154 160 155 153 152 153 143 139 128 103
Changes in working capital -45 -14 9 -23 -31 -34 -32 -30 -27 -26 -19 -15 -10
Free cash flow -76 -52 -39 -19 -7 4 17 41 52 74 97
Base Scenario
€ million 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Sales 2 450 2 662 2 732 2 807 2 938 3 171 3 451 3 739 3 973 4 188 4 351 4 481 4 571
of which Argentina 952 1 052 1 058 1 052 1 078 1 124 1 218 1 308 1 390 1 463 1 521 1 567 1 598
of which Brazil 1 351 1 441 1 498 1 567 1 660 1 830 1 999 2 185 2 324 2 453 2 546 2 622 2 675
of which China 148 169 176 187 200 217 234 246 259 273 284 292 298
EBITDA 65 77 82 78 85 98 111 126 142 159 173 192 199
EBITDA margin (%) 2,7% 2,9% 3,0% 2,8% 2,9% 3,1% 3,2% 3,4% 3,6% 3,8% 4,0% 4,3% 4,3%
EBIT 33 40 42 24 25 31 38 47 57 68 79 95 100
Capex 106 128 135 139 143 146 152 154 147 136 131 124 99
Changes in working capital -45 -14 9 -8 -13 -23 -28 -29 -23 -21 -16 -13 -9
Free cash flow -76 -61 -53 -35 -26 -15 0 21 32 50 76
Weighted Scenario
Source: Company data 
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The DIA Group 
The secret of franchising. DIA argues that franchises 
are able to increase their margins. This is due to the fact 
that the standard franchise is located in more rural areas 
and it is a family owned business where the entrepreneur 
might work with his/her family. This way DIA benefits 
from the local expertise of the entreperneur and the store 
network benefits from greater flexibility that a large 
corporation cannot afford. Furthermore, shrinkage and 
utilities cost tend to decrease when the owner works in 
store. 
Fresh is on the spotlight. 
Global trends are favoring 
fresh products and 
perishables as a response of 
higher demand for quality 
and healthier products. In 
order to keep update to 
consumer habbits DIA 
lauched a new store format: 
DIA fresh and Fresh by 
DIA. These stores are 
smaller than riginal DIA 
stores and are focused on 
fresh produce and 
perishables. Furthermore, 
the company is remodeling 
its main banner: DIA 
Market for a more oriented 
and specialized fresh offer. 
Likely outperformer. Taking into consideration DIA’s impeccable track record, including 
increasing margins in a difficult deflationary environment, it is for sure an attractive company and 
has good chances of being a winner. 
Perpetual Growth 2,0%
Wacc 5,8%
















Percentage of Franchise stores in total stores







1H2010 2010 1H2011 2011 1H2012 2012 1H2013 2013 1H2014
Source: Company data 
Source: Company data 
Strenghts Weaknesses
- Attractive format: Price, Proximity & Franchise; - Dependence on the Iberia market;
- Price leadership perception; - Negative "Like-for-Like" in Iberia;
- Strong private label penetration; - Dependence on the convenience discount format;
- High margins;
Opportunities Threats
- Emerging markets growth prospects; - Deflationary environment in Iberia;
- Consolidation in the Spanish market; - Hyperinflation and decelerating growth in emerging countries;
- Clarel as a source of differentiation and growth in  new segment; - Very hostile competitive environment in Portugal;
- Exchange rate volatility;
- Loss of control over the franchisees
Swot
Source: Own estimations 
Market Cap (€ Million) P/E 2014 P/E 2015 EV/EBITDA 2014 EV/EBITDA 2015 EV/EBIT 2014 EV/EBIT 2015
Ahold 13 107 16,5 14,5 7,1 6,8 12,0 11,4
Jerónimo Martins 5 185 15,6 15,3 8,0 7,7 12,7 12,6
Colruyt 6 020 17,0 16,5 8,3 8,2 11,6 11,7
Carrefour 18 428 16,4 14,2 6,9 6,4 11,0 10,2
Harmonic Average 8 171 16,3 15,1 7,5 7,2 11,8 11,4
DIA 3 724 14,8 14,5 8,0 7,9 12,3 12,6
DIA's implied share price (€) 6,27 5,65 5,84 5,44 5,99 5,17
Average (€) 5,73
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To summarize, DIA has an attractive store format, suitable for the 
world market trends; is present in emerging countries, which might 
provide good sources for growth; has been able to increase its 
margins, even in a deflationary environment; and its offer is well 
perceived by the customers. In contrast, DIA is highly depended on 
its Iberia operations, which are currently facing a competitive and 
deflationary environment; its emerging operations might face 
macroeconomic headwinds and with the increase share of franchise 
DIA might lose some control over operations and potential  
unhappy franchisees can deeply affect the company’s performance. 
 
 
Enterprise Value Iberia 4 521
Enterprise Value Emerging Markets 1 086







Price at December 31, 2014 5,6
Potential Upside 36%
Rating Buy
Source: Own estimations 
€ million 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Sales 9 708 9 844 7 838 8 906 9 411 9 775 10 092 10 411 10 700 10 993 11 217 11 411 11 549
% gowth -0,2% 1,4% -20,4% 13,6% 5,7% 3,9% 3,2% 3,2% 2,8% 2,7% 2,0% 1,7% 1,2%
p.m. Iberia 5 117 5 284 5 106 5 953 6 142 6 166 6 165 6 176 6 194 6 226 6 259 6 305 6 340
% gowth 3,4% 3,3% -3,4% 16,6% 3,2% 0,4% 0,0% 0,2% 0,3% 0,5% 0,5% 0,7% 0,6%
p.m. Emerging markets 2 450 2 662 2 732 2 953 3 269 3 609 3 927 4 235 4 506 4 767 4 958 5 106 5 208
% gowth 21,8% 8,6% 2,6% 8,1% 10,7% 10,4% 8,8% 7,8% 6,4% 5,8% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0%
Gross Profit 2 085 2 166 1 709 1 924 2 033 2 111 2 180 2 249 2 311 2 375 2 423 2 465 2 495
% of Sales 21,5% 22,0% 21,8% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6%
EBITDA 615 642 577 566 593 621 646 678 724 763 796 827 835
% of Sales 6,3% 6,5% 7,4% 6,3% 6,3% 6,4% 6,4% 6,5% 6,8% 6,9% 7,1% 7,2% 7,2%
p.m. Iberia 457 505 495 474 489 502 512 530 553 573 588 597 603
% of Sales 8,9% 9,6% 9,7% 8,0% 8,0% 8,1% 8,3% 8,6% 8,9% 9,2% 9,4% 9,5% 9,5%
p.m. Emerging markets 65 77 82 92 105 119 134 148 171 191 208 230 232
% of Sales 2,7% 2,9% 3,0% 3,1% 3,2% 3,3% 3,4% 3,5% 3,8% 4,0% 4,2% 4,5% 4,5%
EBIT 347 375 377 342 346 364 379 403 442 475 504 531 537
% of Sales 3,6% 3,8% 4,8% 3,8% 3,7% 3,7% 3,8% 3,9% 4,1% 4,3% 4,5% 4,7% 4,6%
p.m. Iberia 300 352 335 304 303 314 321 337 359 378 393 402 407
% of Sales 5,9% 6,7% 6,6% 5,1% 4,9% 5,1% 5,2% 5,5% 5,8% 6,1% 6,3% 6,4% 6,4%
p.m. Emerging markets 33 40 42 38 43 50 57 66 83 98 111 129 130
% of Sales 1,4% 1,5% 1,5% 1,3% 1,3% 1,4% 1,5% 1,6% 1,8% 2,0% 2,2% 2,5% 2,5%
Associated companies 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial results -26 -40 -40 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21
Non-recurring items -38 -49 -50 -50 -50 -50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBT 283 286 287 272 276 293 358 383 421 455 483 510 516
Taxes -102 -96 -87 -78 -72 -77 -94 -101 -112 -121 -130 -138 -139
Net Profit (from continuing operations) 182 191 200 194 203 216 264 282 309 333 353 372 377
Income from discontinued operations -35 5 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minority interest 12 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Profit Attributable to the Company 158 209 276 194 203 216 264 282 309 333 353 372 377
Underlying Net Profit 204 228 250 244 253 266 264 282 309 333 353 372 377
Underlying EPS 0,387 0,378 0,393 0,412 0,409 0,436 0,479 0,516 0,548 0,577 0,583
% growth -2,4% 4,0% 4,9% -0,7% 6,7% 9,8% 7,7% 6,1% 5,3% 1,2%
Dividend payout ratio 41% 45% 45% 49% 50% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75%
Dividend 83,9 103,4 112,4 118,2 126,7 199,4 198,0 211,3 232,0 249,9 265,1 279,3 282,5
Dividend per share 0,13 0,16 0,17 0,18 0,20 0,31 0,31 0,33 0,36 0,39 0,41 0,43 0,44
% growth 15,7% 23,2% 8,7% 5,2% 7,2% 57,4% -0,7% 6,7% 9,8% 7,7% 6,1% 5,3% 1,2%
€ million 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Goodwill 423 454 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308
Net property plant and equipment 1 619 1 602 1 357 1 653 1 788 1 901 2 003 2 091 2 167 2 224 2 271 2 297 2 297
Cash & cash equivalents 350 262 370 263 264 276 270 298 348 421 500 600 711
Inventory 527 545 429 489 516 536 554 571 587 603 616 626 634
Trade receivables 180 210 215 244 258 268 276 285 293 301 307 313 316
Other assets 306 298 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378
Assets available for sale 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Assets 3 405 3 371 3 057 3 336 3 512 3 668 3 790 3 931 4 082 4 236 4 380 4 523 4 645
Financial dept 980 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913
Trade payables 1 759 1 787 1 418 1 616 1 707 1 773 1 831 1 889 1 941 1 994 2 035 2 070 2 095
Provisions 101 81 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Other liabilities 418 406 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309
Liabilities associated with asset held for sale 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Liabilities 3 257 3 187 2 701 2 899 2 990 3 056 3 114 3 172 3 224 3 277 3 318 3 353 3 378
Total Equity 148 184 356 437 522 612 676 760 858 959 1 063 1 170 1 267
Retained earnings 184 356 437 522 612 676 760 858 959 1 063 1 170
Net profit 276 194 203 216 264 282 309 333 353 372 377
Dividends -103 -112 -118 -127 -199 -198 -211 -232 -250 -265 -279
Total Liabilities & Shareholders Funds 3 405 3 371 3 057 3 336 3 513 3 668 3 790 3 932 4 082 4 237 4 381 4 523 4 646
DIA’s P&L (Own estimations) 
DIA’s Balance Sheet (Own estimations) 
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Abstract 
This paper aims to evaluate the Spanish food retail company, Distribuidora Internacional de 
Alimentacion, DIA, and ultimately set a price target and a buy/sell recommendation. In order 
to complete this goal the state of the art of valuation was discussed by briefly describing the 
different valuation models, in order to access the most accurate method to evaluate DIA. 
Furthermore, both DIA’s historical financials and future strategy were deeply analyzed and a 
set of consistent projections constructed. Using the sum of parts method together with the 
multiples analysis, a target price of €7,6 was computed, suggesting that the stock is 
undervalued in the market, with a potential upside of 36%. Finally, the estimations and 
results, presented is this paper, were compared with an analyst’s report from Morgan Stanley. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is the outcome of the academic thesis of a Catolica Lisbon’s master student. The 
broad subject is finance and the seminar specific topic is equity valuation with professor José 
Tudela Martins. The aim of this thesis is to evaluate a public company listed on a stock 
exchange and ultimately present a price target and a buy/sell recommendation. Moreover the 
executive summary should have the same structure as an analyst’s financial report in order to 
be suitable for publishing. The comparison between the present valuation and a report from a 
major investment bank, Morgan Stanley, was also made. Accordingly with the assumptions 
and methods used the author came up with a target price of €7,6, suggesting that the stock is 
undervalued in the market, with a potential upside of 36%, considering the price closing on 
December 31, 2014 of €5,6 per share. 
The company analyzed in this article is Distribuidora Internacional de Alimentación, hereon 
referred as “DIA”, and is traded on the main Spanish stock Exchange, IBEX 35. This 
company was chosen because:  
 It operates in a sector which the author has professional interest: food retail market;  
 Its international scope: it is present in five countries in three continents, including 
Portugal with the Minipreço banner;  
 It has a very interesting store format and strategy accordingly with the trends in the 
market: “Price, Proximity and Franchise” and great focus on private label;  
 Its track record is impeccable, especially after the spin off with Carrefour in 2011, 
with an EBIT margin increase of 80 basis points, and the successful sale of 
underperforming operations such as its operations in Turkey, in Beijing and more 
recently in French; 
 DIA provides a substantial amount of public information and has an investor’s relation 
department ready to help; 
 It is a challenging and complex case of valuation, with the sale and purchase of 
businesses during the explicit period. 
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way: on the next section the state of the art 
of valuation will be presented with a brief description of the discount factors and main 
valuation methods. On the third section the macroeconomics indicators which affect the 
business are discussed and the food retail market is analyzed. The fourth section describes the 
company. Then, the valuation assumptions and methods used are presented in the sixth 
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section. The comparison with a valuation made by a top financial bank is on the seventh 
section, and finally the last section contains the main conclusions taken from this thesis. 
2. Literature Review 
In this section the main valuation methods are summarized and their advantages and 
disadvantages discussed, in order to find the reasoning behind the chosen approaches: the 
sum of parts method, and the multiples analysis to complement the valuation.  
2.1. Why is valuation important? 
“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.”  Warren Buffet 
This famous quote from one of the most respectful investors, Warren Buffet, seems simple 
and obvious but it has an important teaching. It suggests that the concepts of price and value 
are not the same. Price is something objective (is the amount paid for a product or service) 
while value is subjective to personal interpretation. Therefore, valuation is important in 
order to access the value, decide about the reasonability of the price and help the 
decision making.  
In accordance, Mauboussin (2006) defends that investors' objective is: “Buying a stream of 
cash flows for less than what it is worth”, reinforcing the importance of valuation. 
“Today valuation is the financial analytical skill that general managers want to learn and 
master more than any other.” Luehrman 1997 
Valuation has high practical relevance by helping the decision making process. For 
instance, when deciding to buy something, the buyer asks himself “is this worth the money?”. 
This question suggests a process of analyzing and accessing whether the price is higher or 
lower than the value, a process of valuation.  
Moreover, valuation models are very useful for computing a target price on a listed company 
or for an IPO, to evaluate inheritances and wills, to build compensation schemes based on 
value creation, to indentify value drivers, to help strategic decisions and to influence strategic 
planning (Fernández 2013). 
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2.2. Approaches to valuation 
“The goal of company valuation is to give owners, potential buyers and other interested 
stakeholders an approximate value of what a company is worth. There are different 
approaches to determine this value but some general guidelines apply to all of them.” Steiger 
2008 
Accordingly to Fernandez (2002) the discount valuation models based on the same 
assumptions should be equivalent, however Kruschwitz and Loffler (1998) defend that 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) and Adjusted Present Value (APV) methods will 
provide necessarily different values. Furthermore, Demirakos, Strong and Walker (2009) state 
that, although in theory price-to-earnings and discount models should produce similar 
valuation if implemented consistently, in practice these methods usually output different 
results. 
The discount model is generally considered as the best valuation method and is widely used 
(Luehrman 1997), but there is no one method that is best suited for every situation.  
To concluded, there are a vast number of valuation methods and there is a fierce discussion 
between analysts and academic researchers about which model outputs the best estimation of 
the “true” value. Furthermore, it is fair to say that there is no right or wrong method and 
the “best one” will depend on the characteristics of the firm being analyzed, and the 
analysts’ personal perspective (Demirakos, Strong & Walker 2009) 
Finally, five main groups of methods were identified: Discounted Cash flow valuation, value 
creation approach, relative valuation, contingent claim valuation and asset-based valuation 
(Fernandez 2007). 
 
Exhibit 1: Valuation methods 
- Dividend Discount 
Model (DDM)




- Binomial Model - Book Value




- Black-Scholes - Liquidation Value
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2.2.1. Discount cash flow models 
“Cash is king”. This is one of the most known quotes in finance and it suggests that cash 
generation is an essential concept in valuation.  
In accordance, Fernandez (2013) defends that, “the most suitable method for valuing a 
company is to discount the expected future cash flows, as the value of a company’s equity - 
assuming it continues to operate - arises from the company’s capacity to generate cash for the 
equity’s owners.” 
Taking Fernandez words in consideration, all the variants of discount cash flow model have 
the same basic mechanic behind them: a stream of future cash flows actualized for the 
present moment by a discount rate which reflects the risk associated with the business. 
                          1   
             
                    
   
   
 
What differs between models is the stream of cash flows and the discount factor.  
Moreover, on the next sub-sections the inputs for this formula will be discussed. Firstly the 
discount factor and all its drivers are presented on a journey to ultimately estimate the 
weighted average cost of capital and secondly the cash flow streams for each model are 
identified. 
2.2.1.1. The discount factor 
“The opportunity cost is the return a company (or its owners) could expect to earn on 
an alternative investment entailing the same risk” Luehrman 1997 
The discount factor is the denominator on the models formulae and represents the opportunity 
cost of the investment. This section will deeply analyze its components including the cost of 
equity, the cost of debt and the capital structure. 
2.2.1.1.1. Cost of equity 
“Opportunity cost consists partly of time value – the return on a nominally risk-free 
investment. This is the return you earn for being patient without bearing any risk. Opportunity 
cost also includes a risk premium – the extra return you can expect commensurate with the 
risk you are willing to bear.” Luehrman 1997 
                                                          
1
 In all equations in this article the letter “t” corresponds to one period, when it appears “t-1” it means “previous 
period”. 
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The cost of equity is the rate of return required by the equity holders of a company. Although 
there are several risk and return models, they are all based on the fact that: for higher risk 
investors will demand higher returns; and investors should only be rewarded for non 
diversifiable risk. 




“The CAPM reveals the return that investors require for bearing the risk of holding a 
company’s share.” Steiger 2008 
                                                           
On the next sub-sections the inputs for the CAPM formula will be discussed and analyzed. 
2.2.1.1.1.1. Risk free rate 
“Risk in finance is viewed in terms of the variance in actual returns around the expected 
return. For an investment to be risk free in this environment, then, the actual returns should 
always be equal to the expected return” Damodaran 2008 
In short, risk free is something which provides an expected cash flow with a 100% 
probability.  
Furthermore, to be risk free, the asset must fulfill two conditions:  
 No default risk: only government securities can potentially accomplish this condition, 
once they can print money to meet their promises
3
, while “Even the largest and safest 
firms have some measure of default risk.” (Damodaran 2008); 
  No reinvestment risk, this condition makes only zero coupon securities suited for 
risk free, once otherwise it would not be possible to predict the reinvestment rates of 
the coupons. 
Furthermore, according with Damodoran (2008) “A risk free investment should have returns 
that are uncorrelated with risky investments in a market”. 
Moreover, the security must be denominated in the same currency as the company’s cash 
flows in order to handle inflation consistently. Regarding the maturity of the risk free asset it 
should be equal to the length of the cash flows. As we assume that the firm will continue 
operating in the long run it might be arguable to use the longest maturity. However, since the 
                                                          
2
 Other alternatives are the use of multi-factor models such as Fama and French model and the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory. 
3
 However history tells us that governments might not honor their agreements. 
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30 year bonds usually have liquidity problems, the 10 year government bonds in generally 
used (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 2010 and Damodaran 2008). 
Finally, in the Euro zone none of the members have full control of the Euro currency supply 
and consequently all have some default risk. In this case it is usually used the 10 year German 
Bund which is highly liquid and has the lowest credit risk among the European countries. To 
conclude, as DIA’s cash flows are in Euros, the risk free rate used in this paper will be the 




“Beta represents a stock’s incremental risk to a diversified Investor” Koller, Goedhart & 
Wessels 2010 
Beta is the firm specific risk input of the CAPM model. As Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 
(2010) defend, beta measures the undiversified risk of adding the stock to a diversified 
portfolio.  
Although there are no consensus on how to compute this parameter, for instance Fernandez 
(2013) suggest that beta equal to 1 outperforms calculated betas, the standard procedure is to 
regress stock returns against market returns. In this way beta is be the slop of the regression 
(Damodaran 1996). This implies that a 1% change in the market should reflect a beta % 
change on the stock. Consequently, it is expected that firms with higher betas will be more 
volatile and riskier than lower beta companies.
5
 
There are some practical issues and decisions that must be made regarding beta computation: 
 The market index: the standard procedure is to use the index where the stock is traded, as 
long as it has considerable size and liquidity, while for international cross border investors 
it may be better to consider an international index such as the MSCI world Index or the 
MSCI Europe Index;  
 The length of estimation period: it is standard to use 5 years or 2 years of data; 
 The return interval: there are annual, monthly, weekly, daily or even intra-day returns; 
the shortest intervals provide more observations, however are likely to have a significant 
bias due to non-trading problem
6
, and as such it is standard to use weekly or monthly 
intervals;  
                                                          
4
 Yield from the 10 year German euro bund on October 27, 2014. 
5
 The market beta should be equal to 1 and the risk free asset’s beta equal to 0. 
6
 Non-trading problem: happens when the returns in non-trading periods are zero, even though the market may 
have moved during those periods. 
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 Adjusted betas: Bloomberg estimates betas by adjusting them towards one7, in accordance 
to studies which defend that there is a tendency for betas to move that way (Damodaran 
1996). 
Alternatively, one can use comparables to compute company’s beta, using similar companies 
from the same industry, or with similar fundamentals, like growth, profitability, and leverage. 
The rationale behind this is that similar companies should have similar firm specific risk, and 
consequently similar betas (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 2010). 
As far as this analysis is concerned it will be used the MSCI Europe Index as benchmark, 
because it is an international index
8
 whose currency is the same as DIA’s. Furthermore, it will 
be used the adjusted beta from Bloomberg with the length of 5 years
9
 in order to mitigate the 
sharp decrease of the food retail market during the last year
10
 and a weekly return interval. 
The beta computed this way was 1,1. 
As a final remark, the beta referred until now was the levered beta, however to compute the 
adjusted present value approach the unlevered beta
11
 must be computed. In accordance to 
Damodaran (2003), the relationship between the levered and unlevered beta is: 
                                  -     
    
        
12  
2.2.1.1.1.3. Market risk premium 
“The risk premium used in the CAPM is generally based upon historical data, and the 
premium is defined to be the difference between average returns on stocks and average return 
s on risk free securities” Damodaran 1996 
There are three approaches to compute the market risk premium:  
 Historical premiums: use the historical difference between de stock market and the 
risk free rate;  
 Survey investors or managers: in order to access their risk premiums relative to the 
risk free rate, and; 
 Forward-looking premiums: implied from today’s market prices (Domodaran 2012). 
                                                          
7
                                         
 
   
8
 The author assumed that DIA has diversified investors for which an international index would be a better 
benchmark than the local index 
9
 Which in practice is corresponds to three and half years since DIA started to trade on the stock market on July 
2011 
10
 The decrease is partially explained by the low inflation registered in Europe during 2014 and is expected to be 
temporarily. 
11
 Unlevered beta is the beta as if the company would be 100% financed by equity. 
12
 Assuming that the beta of debt is zero 
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                                                              e 
Moreover, historical premiums can be computed by arithmetic or geometric average. On one 
hand, the first one generally outputs higher premiums and is considered as a better predictor 
for next year premiums
13
. On the other hand, the latter is considered as a better predictor for 
long term premiums once it takes into account the compounding factor (Damodaran 2012).  
For what valuation is concerned, as the cash flows analyzed are over a long period of time, the 
geometric average might be a best predictor. Additionally, accordingly to Koller, Goedhart & 
Wessels (2010) it should be used the longest period possible to estimate the market risk 
premium since short term periods are extremely “noisy”. 
“Globally diversified investors will demand lower discount rates.” Sabal 2003 
Another important issue is whether investors are diversified or not. From surveys, individual 
investors require higher risk premiums than institutional (more diversified) investors 
(Damodaran 2012). According to Koller, Goedhart & Wessels (2010) market risk premiums 
for a diversified investor should range between 4,5% and 5,5%. 
As DIA’s ownership consists of global diversified investors (20%) (See appendix I) and free 
float
14
 (80%), it is reasonable to assume that DIA’s shareholders are diversified and for this 
reason a market risk premium of 5,5% will be used.  
2.2.1.1.1.4. Country risk premium  
“In effect, should we demand one global equity risk premium that we use for investments all 
over the world or should we use higher equity risk premiums in some markets than in 
others?” Damoradan 2012 
The country risk premium concept surges as some countries are exposed to additional risks 
comparing to others. A typical example is that emergent markets are riskier than developed 
markets. Some examples of additional risks are high levels of inflation, macroeconomic 
volatility, capital controls, political instability, war or civil unrest, regulatory changes, poorly 
defined or enforced contract and investor’s rights, lax accounting controls and corruption 
(James & Koller 2000).  
There are two main opinions regarding how to measure the country risk. Some argue that a 
country risk factor should be added to the discount rate on the “business as usual” 
scenario (Damodaran 2012 and 2009). While others defend that risk should be incorporated 
                                                          
13
 Koller, Goedhart & Wessels (2010) suggest the use of the arithmetic average with 10 year dated intervals  
14
 According to the company, DIA has a widely disperse international base of investors. 
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on the cash flows
15
 (James & Koller 2000, Goedhart & Haden 2003 and Koller, Goedhart & 
Wessels 2010).  
Both approaches are supported by strong arguments. Damodaran (2012 and 2009) uses 
empirical evidence showing that the correlation between markets is increasing, which makes 
diversification unlikely. On the opposite side, the main arguments are: the correlation between 
markets is low and consequently the risks can be diversified; a probability-weighted scenario 
provides a better understanding of what is creating (or destroying) value and have a more 
solid analytical basis; many risks are idiosyncratic and don’t apply equally for all the 
industries and companies of the country being analyzed
16
. 
After deep consideration, the method used in the present paper is the probability-weighted 
scenario once the author believes that this approach provides a better understanding about 
how different risks impact the value of the company and that country risks do not impact 
equally all firms for which it seems too simplistic to merely use an additional risk premium to 
the discount rate. 
Furthermore, another valuation issue of operating in emerging markets is how to treat 
inflation. Inflation leads to lower value creation and must be handled consistently in the 
construction of the discount rate and the projection of the cash flows (Damodaran 2009 
and Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 2010). As DIA publishes all items in Euros the discount rate 
used in this paper will be in Euros and the inflation will be handling accordingly to the 
purchasing power parity
17
 for which it will be assumed that the inflation is adjusted by the 
exchange rate. 
2.2.1.1.2. Cost of debt 
“The cost of debt should be the rate at which a company could refinance its existing debt in 
the current market conditions.” Bancel, Lathuille & Lhuissier 2013 
The cost of debt is the rate of return required by the debt holders of a company. Accordingly 
to Koller, Goedhart & Wessels (2010) and Bancel, Lathuille & Lhuissier (2013): 
                                              
Taxes must be taken into account. 
                                                 
                                                          
15
 The discount rate should only reflect non diversifiable risk 
16
 It is important to note that both approaches cannot be used together once this would mean double counting of 
the risk and deeply undervalue the company. 
17
 The purchasing power party theory defends that exchange rates should adjust in order to the prices in different 
countries to be similar, which is the same to say that exchange rates should adjust to the inflation, at least on the 
long run.  
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Where the bond rating and the collateral establish the default spread. 
Furthermore, it is usually used the company’s yield to maturity, using the promised yield on 
newly issued long term debt
18
 or the company’s debt rating as an estimative
19
. 
For what this valuation is concerned, the credit rating of Baa3 and BBB- attributed by 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s respectively, will be used to compute DIA’s spread. 
Therefore the spread of 1,6% (See appendix II) was computed. Then, by adding the risk free 
rate, outputs a cost of debt of 2,3%. 
2.2.1.1.2.1. Tax 
“According to the AFP survey, only 29% of practitioners use the marginal corporate tax rate 
of the country in which the company pays its taxes (considered the best approach by most 
experts). One of the reasons might be the difficulty to estimate this rate on a consolidated 
basis across countries for MNCs.” Bancel, Lathuille & Lhuissier 2013 
Debt is generally a cheaper way of financing than equity because it is tax deductable 
(Gruninger & kind 2013 and Steiger 2008) and has more senior claims regarding company’s 
cash flows. However it is important to point that firms only benefit from tax benefits if they 
are profitable or it are expected to be profitable in the future. 
There are three ways of estimating the tax rate:  
 The statutory tax rate, which is the legal imposed corporate tax: has the advantage of 
being simple and straight forward but it might overstate the tax effect;  
 The effective tax rate, which corresponds to the taxes incurred divided by the taxable 
income: it is a simple way and takes into account the firm’s tax history, however does 
not handle well one-off items;  
 The marginal tax rate, which is the rate at which the last dollar of income is taxed: 
although is considered to be the best proxy, is generally harder to estimate
20
 (Franck, 
Quentin & Alban 2013, Steiger 2008 and Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 2010). 
Regarding DIA’s valuation, the Spanish expected statutory tax will be used, accordingly with 
the projection of the company, corresponding to 30%, 28% and 25% for 2014, 2015 and 2016 
onwards, respectively.  
                                                          
18
 This method is not a good proxy for firms with low credit rating and high default risk once it is expected that 
the promising cash flows don’t represent the actual cash flows. 
19
 There are other less used methods to compute the cost of equity such as the CAPM (Oded, Michel and 
Feinstein 2011) or simply assume the risk free rate (Gruninger and Kind 2013). 
20
 Once it requires the existence of a reconciliation table in order to manage tax consolidation across countries. 
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2.2.1.1.3. Capital structure 
“The financial structure of the firm, including the dividend policy, does not affect the 
computed free cash flow. The financial structure does affect the valuation of free cash flow, 
though, through the WACC computation.” Jennergren 2011 
The last ingredient to estimate the weighted average cost of capital are the weights, defined by 
the capital structure, which corresponds to the proportion of debt and equity in regard to 
enterprise value (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 2010). 
To compute this ratio market values and not book values should be used. The intuition 
behind this is that if the company issues either new debt or equity, it will be at market prices 
(Damodaran 1996 and Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 2010). Additionally, it should correspond 
to the company’s strategic target ratio
21
. 
Accordingly to DIA’s investor relations department, the company as the target net debt
22
 ratio 
to range between 0,9 and 1,1 times EBITDA. Therefore it is expected that DIA will adjust its 
debt accordingly and maintain a stable debt ratio. 
2.2.1.1.4. Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
“The WACC represents the opportunity cost that investors face for investing their funds in 
one particular business instead of others with similar risk.” Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 2010 
All the building blocks presented and explained before are used to compute the weighted 
average cost of capital. WACC includes the required rate of return of all investors, namely 
equity, debt and hybrid securities
23
 owners, weighted by their market values. 
             
24                           
      
                  y 
Moreover the WACC includes the value from interests tax shield, by the use of the after-tax 
cost of debt, and implicitly captures the expected bankruptcy costs (Damodaran 2006). 
An important note is that WACC only works if the company has its capital structure fixed. 
Otherwise the APV model (presented on the next section) should be used. 
Finally the author came up with a WACC for DIA of 5,8% reflecting all investors' required 
rate of returns. 
                                                          
21
 In case that the capital structure is very volatile it should be used the APV model rather than the WACC. 
22
                                            
23
 As hybrid securities do not apply to DIA’s valuation I simplified the formula in order to contain only equity 
and debt. 
24
 Note: EV = Enterprise Value. 
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2.2.1.1.5. Explicit period vs Terminal value 
“Since you cannot estimate cash flows forever, you generally impose closure in discounted 
cash flow valuation by stopping your estimation of cash flows sometime in the future and then 
computing a terminal value that reflects the value of the firm at that point”. Damodaran 2006 
Before analyzing each discount cash flow model, the concepts of explicit period and terminal 
value will be presented once they are transversal. 
If the company is not on the “steady sate”
25
 it is expected to change its fundamentals namely 
growth, margins and capital structure in the short/medium term. Therefore the explicit period 
is used to capture these changes until the firm reaches maturity. Finally, the length of this 
stage will depend on the firm but is usually used an explicit period between 5 and 10 years
26
. 
The terminal value is the perpetuity calculated when the firm reaches maturity. It is important 
to note that the perpetual growth cannot exceed the long term economy growth, because it 
would be greater than the economy in the long run, nor be negative, because it would 
disappear in the long run (Damodaran 2006). 
                 
             
                  
   
   
 
               
               
                                     
                  
 
Furthermore, some methods will output the value of the equity and others the value of the 
firm. In order to get the equity value from the firm value it must be added the non-operational 
assets such as cash and marketable securities and subtracted the non-equity claims namely 
debt, capitalized leases, provisions, unfunded pension plan obligations, minority interests and 
off balance sheet items
27
 (Steiger 2008). 
                                                                                    
Finally, to get the price per share the following formula is used: 
                  
            
                           
 
                                                          
25 
“Steady state” refers to the period when the company is mature and is expected to grow at the same rate 
forever 
26
 Use less than 5 years only in almost mature firms and more than 10 years is very difficult to estimate in a 
reasonable way all the inputs the models need. 
27
 Market values should be used. 
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2.2.1.2. Dividend discount model (DDM) 
“A stock is worth the present value of all the dividends ever to be paid upon it, no more, no 
less.” The Theory of Investment Value by John Burr Williams (1938) 
There are two possible cash flows from buying a stock: dividends, during the period that the 
investor holds the stock, and the price from the sale of the asset. The discount dividend model 
intuitively values the equity of the company by discounting the future dividends by the cost of 
equity (Damodaran 2006).  
              
            
                      
   
   
 
The Gordon Model uses the perpetuity formula and assumes a perpetual growth of dividends: 
             
         
                                      
 
To conclude the dividend model is simple and very intuitive, however it has some limitations. 
It typically undervalues companies
28
, its use is limited to stable companies and, as dividends 
are “sticky”, they may not represent the true performance of the company (Brav et al. 2004 
and Damodaran 2006). Finally, given the limitations mentioned the dividend discount model 
was not considered for the purpose of valuating DIA. 
2.2.1.3. Free cash flow to the equity (FCFE) 
“The FCFE model treats the stockholder in a publicly traded firm as the equivalent of the 
owner in a private business. The latter can lay claim on all cash flows left over in the business 
after taxes, debt payments and reinvestment needs have been met.” Damodaran 2006 
The free cash flow to the equity discounts the cash left from the business, after paying taxes, 
debt and reinvestment needs, by the cost of equity, in order to get the company’s equity value. 
To compute the free cash flow to the equity the following formula is used: 
                                                                          
                                     
              
        
                     
   
   
 
                                                          
28
 The dividend discount model usually undervalues the company unless the dividend payment is higher than the 
free cash flow to the equity which in this case it might overvalue the company. 
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The dividend discount model and the free cash flow to the equity model output different 




The free cash flow cash flow to the equity has the advantage of taking into account the claims 
on the non-distributed earnings, however it comes with the cost of having to estimate a lot 
more factors, including capital expenditures, working capital and financing cash flows. 
2.2.1.4. Free cash flow for the firm (FCFF) 
“The free cash flows to the firm are the sum of the cash flows to all claimholders in the firm, 
including stockholders, bondholders and preferred stockholders” Damodaran 1996 
In contrast with the dividend discount and free cash flow to the equity models the free cash 
flow to the firm values the enterprise value instead of the equity value. The intuition behind 
this approach is the idea that ultimately equity and bond investors are partners (Damodaran 
2006) and that value must come from the operations regardless the financing structure. 
To compute the free cash flow to the firm the following formula is used: 
                                                                
                          
            
        
           
   
   
 
As the author considers the intuition behind the free cash flow model valid and it does not 
require to estimate the debt cash flow explicitly this method will be used on DIA’s valuation. 
 
2.2.1.4.1. Sum of parts 
“On many occasions, the company’s value is calculated as the sum of the values of its 
different divisions or business units” Fernandez 2013 
The sum of parts valuation approach consists in valuing different business divisions of the 
company separately. It is very useful to value multi-business or multi-national companies 
(Damodaran 2009) and access which business units or geographies are adding or destroying 
value. This way, managers can make valuation based investment decisions, allocating capital 
on high growth and added value branches and divest in underperforming segments. The 
                                                          
29
 If companies decide to distribute all its excess cash to shareholders both model will output the same result. 
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author believes that this approach is very informative and will be used to evaluate DIA’s 
business separately in Iberia and emerging markets. 
2.2.1.5. Adjusted present value (APV) 
“In the adjusted present value (APV) approach, we separate the effects on value of debt 
financing from the value of the assets of a business.” Damodaran 2006 
It can be said that The APV model relies on the principal of “value additivity” (Luehrman 
1997). First the unlevered value of firm is computed, then the present value of the tax shields 
are added, and finally the expected bankruptcy costs are subtracted (Damodaran 2006). 
                                                                    
                         
Unlevered value of the firm 
The unlevered value of the firm is calculated the same as valuing a company without debt 
(100% equity financed). Consequently, the operating cash flows
30
 should be discounted at the 
unlevered cost of equity (Jennergren 2011). 
                      
        
                               
   
   
 
Present Value of Tax Shields 
As debt interests are usually tax deductable there is a benefit from holding debt instead of 
equity on the form of tax shields. The latter is comprised by the futures interests times the tax 
rate, discounted back to the present at a discount rate. 
                              
                         
                      
   
   
 
There is no consensus about the discount factor that should be used to discount tax shields. 
Myers, together with Luehrman (1997), defend that the tax shields should be discounted using 
the cost of debt, Harris and Pringle, on the other side, say that it should be used the unlevered 
cost of equity. More recently Fernandez (2006) argues that it should be the difference between 
the present value of taxes for the unleveraged company, and the present value of taxes for the 
leveraged company. 
 
                                                          
30
 The operating cash flow is the same as the free cash flow for the firm already described on the previous 
section. 
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If we assume the first hypothesis then, in perpetuity we have: 
                             
                         
           
                  
Bankruptcy Costs 
The benefits of debt come with a cost: increasing probability of default and consequently 
expected bankruptcy costs. The costs can be either direct, such as lawyer fees, or indirect, 
such as loss of clients or reduced bargaining power with suppliers, before the company goes 
officially bankrupt. The indirect bankruptcy costs are estimated to be much higher than direct 
costs (Pindado & Rodrigues 2005). To access the probability of default it is generally used 
company’s bond rating. 
                                                                         
2.2.1.6. FCFF vs APV 
“WACC can only be applied if the leverage ratio of the company is deterministic and known 
at time t = 0. APV can be used to evaluate the firm if the amount of future debt is 
deterministic and known today” Kruschwitz & Loffer 
Both the WACC and the APV have their advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, the 
WACC does not properly work in companies which are expected to change their capital 
structure significantly. In these situations is advisable to use the APV method since it provides 
flexibility to change debt in every period, and take its effects into account (Koller, Goedhart 
& Wessels 2010).  
On the other hand, on the APV bankruptcy costs are very hard to estimate, especially the 
indirect costs. To avoid these estimations, most practitioners ignore bankruptcy costs, which 
is not reasonable and will overestimate the value of the firm, especially if it is high levered 
and therefore with high the bankruptcy costs (Damodaran 2006).  
To conclude, although the APV model is considered as superior by many (Luehrman 1997), 
the bankruptcy costs are very hard to estimate properly and for constant capital ratio firms 
both models will output similar results. The great advantage of the APV is when valuing 
leverage buyouts or debt restructuring projects because in these situations capital structure is 
very volatile. Once DIA as a target net debt to EBITDA between 0,9x and 1,1x the author 
decided to use the WACC model in this paper. 
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2.2.2. Value creation 
“Value is created by generating excess returns on investments” Damodaran 2006 
Value creation models have their roots in capital budgeting and are based on the assumption 
that value is created by the excess returns generated by the firm
31
.  This assumption is 
consistent with the net present value approach once to get a positive NPV the return of the 
project should be higher than its cost of capital. 
The inputs for the economic value added are: the return on capital invested; the cost of 
capital; and the capital invested. This way, the return on capital invested must be higher than 
the cost of capital, in order to create value.  
                                                                    
Or 
                                                   
Furthermore the value of the firm can be computed as: 
                             
       
                      
   
   
 
Finally, in accordance with Fernandez (2013), EVA should be equivalent to the WACC 
method if consistent assumption are taken, however the invested capital is very hard to 
compute
32
, and  “the typical EVA calculation involves 19 adjustments from a menu of 
between 9 and 34 adjustments” (Damodaran 2006). For this reason the author decided to use 
the WACC instead of the EVA. 
2.2.3. Relative valuation 
“Industry multiples are used often in practice, both to provide stand-alone “quick and dirty” 
valuations and to anchor more-complex discounted cash flow valuations.” Liu, Nissim & 
Thomas 2007 
The relative valuation assumes that the market is efficient and uses comparable stock prices 
and fundamentals to establish a price for the target company. The first step is to find the 
comparable peer group. Then, one needs to choose which multiples to apply. The final step is 
                                                          
31
 Excess returns are returns above or below the considered normal returns. 
32 
Both the market and book values are not good proxies because, the first includes growth expectations and the 
latter is deeply affected by the accounting policies  namely the depreciation approach the firm uses. 
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to apply the multiples to the peer group and multiply them by the company’s indicators 
(Damodaran 2006). 
Peer group 
The peer group consists on comparable firms. It is usually chosen by using firms operating 
in the same sector, with the assumption that they are exposed to the same industry risk, with 
same geographical presence and with similar fundamentals of expected growth rate, 
margins and returns on invested capital, leverage ratios and capital investment (Steiger 2008). 
Taking this into account, firms in the same industry (Food retail), with similar store concept 
(Proximity and price), operating in similar geographies (mixed between developed and 
emerging countries) and similar fundamentals, were used to build DIA’s peer group. 
Multiples 
Multiples are ratios between enterprise value or share price
33





 and sales. This paper will focus on four multiples:  
 
Exhibit 2: Multiples 
Each multiple has its advantages and disadvantages and “different multiples are meaningful in 
different contexts” (Goedhart, Koller & Wessels 2005). For instance, price to earnings 
multiple is widely used but is impacted by leverage and cannot be used for loss making 
companies; EBIT based multiples are impacted by amortizations and depreciations which can 
be manipulated, and sales multiples disregard profitability but can be used for all companies
36
.  
Moreover, there is no consensus in which multiple to use. Goedhart, Koller & Wessels (2005) 
argue that the Enterprise value-to-EBITA
37
 multiple is the most appropriate, as it is not 
impacted by the capital structure and one-offs
38
, in contrast Liu, Nissim & Thomas (2001) 
defend that price-to-earnings perform better. 
In contrast, academics and practitioners agree that forward multiples should be used instead 
of current multiples, because they incorporate market growth and return expectations and, as 
                                                          
33 
Share price multiples will output the price per share directly while enterprise multiples output firm value.
 
34 
EBIT=Earnings before interests and taxes.
 
35 
EBITDA =Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations.
 
36 
All companies must have sales.
 
37 
EBITA = Earnings before interests, taxes and amortizations.
 
38 
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they use analysts’ consensus, they usually exclude one-off items (Liu, Nissim & Thomas 2001 
and Goedhart, Koller & Wessels 2005). 
Furthermore, in order to compute the peer’s multiple, the harmonic average was used, since 
according to Baker, Ruback & Draft (1999) is the most precise approach to estimate 
multiples. 
To conclude, although multiples are simple to compute, market related, and widely used, it is 
very difficult to get a “perfect” peer group, some are easy to manipulate and they don’t 
require the use of assumptions. Taking into account the advantages and disadvantages, the 
author believes that multiples should not be used as a standalone method but are a good tool 
to complement a more complex valuation approach, namely the discount cash flow model 
(Goedhart, Koller & Wessels 2005 and Steiger 2008).  
Finally, in the author’s opinion, the best multiples to use to evaluate food retailers would be 
forward EV- to- EBITDAR
39
 or forward EV-to-EBITA because both are capital structure and 
property ownership neutral. As the previous mentioned multiples are not widely available and 
easy to estimate the EV-to-EBITDA and EV-to-EBIT multiples will be used as substitutes. 
The price earnings multiple will also be used because it is widely used by the industry and 
some academics consider it as the most reliable one. 
2.2.4. Contingent claim valuation 
 “With an option, you have the right (not the obligation) to buy or sell something at a specific 
price on or before some future date.” Leuhrman 1997 
The option pricing models are useful to complement a discounted cash flow valuation since it 
handles both opportunities (Leuhrman 1997) and flexibility (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 
2010) better than the DCF models. The latter models usually underestimate assets whose 
payoffs are contingent on the occurrence of a specific event (Damodaran 2005). 
This method can be used to value assets with option characteristics
40
, namely commodity 
based businesses, such as mining and oil projects in which the production output can be 




, or ultimately new product development, expansion 
plans or exit strategies (Fernandez 2013). 
                                                          
39
 EBITDAR = Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations, amortizations and rents. 
40
 For this the asset should has its payoffs linked to an underlying asset. 
41
 For example, if the price of a mineral is low there is the choice between producing and wait until the prices 
increase.  
42 
“A patent can be analyzed as a call option on a product, with the investment outlay needed to get the project 
going representing the strike price and the patent life being the time to expiration of the option.” Damodaran 
(2005). 
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Moreover there are two different option models: the binomial model and the Black-Scholes
43
. 
Both models are based on the same variables: current value and the volatility of the 
underlying asset, the strike price
44
, the risk free rate and the time to maturity. 
To conclude, although the option models can successfully handle complex situation, its 
parameters are very hard to estimate, especially if the underlying asset is not publicly traded. 
For this reason the method was never widely used and it will not be used in this valuation. 
2.2.5. Asset-based valuation 
“Liquidation valuation is likely to yield more realistic estimates of value for firms that are 
distressed” Damodaran 2006 
Asset-based models are based on the assumptions that value comes from the company’s 
balance sheet.  
The book value model assumes that the balance sheet’s book value of equity is a proxy for 
the shareholders’ equity, is useful to value small subsidiaries of a consolidated group; and the 
liquidation value uses the value as if the company would be liquidated, in which its assets 
are sold and debt is paid. The latter represents the company’s minimum value and is useful to 
evaluate distress firms. 
To conclude, asset-base models are useful and reasonable for some specific companies and 
circumstances, however they are generally too conservative once they take into account a 
static point of view and disregard the value of future growth (Fernandez 2013 and Damodaran 
2006). 
2.3. Conclusion 
“Valuation is always a function of three fundamental factors: cash, timing and risk” 
Luehrman 1997 
The literature review provides some insights about valuation. Firstly, cash, timing and risk are 
drivers of value and are transversal to all valuation methods. 
“A valuation has little to do with science. A valuation is always an opinion.” Fernandez 2004 
Secondly, there is no consensus regarding which method outputs the best approximation for 
the “true” value and the models used depend on the firm specific characteristics and analysts 
                                                          
43
 The difference between both models is that the binomial takes into account discrete variation while the Black-
Scholes uses continuous variations. 
44
 The strike price is a fixed value at which the owner can buy or sell the underlying asset. 
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personal preferences. Additionally, it might be agreeable that combined methods might output 
a more robust valuation. 
“Any analysis, however, is only as accurate as the forecasts it relies on.” Goedhart, Koller & 
Wessels 2005 
Thirdly, valuation highly depends on the assumption the analyst makes, therefore it is very 
important to carefully analyze the company, the industry and the macroeconomic 
environment. Additionally, it is essential to stress test the main inputs in order to analyze their 
sensitivity on the output result. 
Finally, the present valuation will use the flowing methods: the discount cash flow model, 
using the free cash flow to the firm and the WACC as the discount rate; and the 
EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and P/E multiples. 
3. Food Retail Business and Macroeconomic Outlook 
Prior to enter on the valuation itself it is crucial to understand the industry and its 
macroeconomic drivers in order to access reasonable trends. 
3.1. Food retail business 
The food retail business is characterized by high volume of sales, low margins, and 
workforce and capital intensive. Therefore, albeit firm specific efficiencies and 
performance, food retail companies might be influenced by the macroeconomic environment, 
namely private consumption and GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, population, and 
interest rates. 
Furthermore, to have a successful food retail business it is essential to reach critical mass. 
This way the company will be able to dilute its fixed costs and to gain bargaining power over 
suppliers. It is also important to have efficient operations, namely in logistics and inventory 
management. In sum, the goal of the food retail business is to put the products on the 
shelves at the lowest possible cost and have the highest rotation possible. 
Moreover, there are several store formats, each one with its characteristics and primarily 
focus. The table below summarizes the main distinct formats: Hypermarkets, large 
superficies with focus on assortment; Discount, with focus on prices and private label 
products; Convenience/Neighborhood, small stores which value proximity; Gourmet, stores 
focused on quality and shopping experience; and Traditional, mainly family owned 
businesses whose best advantage is to have a personalized service. 
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Exhibit 3: Store formats 
Finally, the food retail business is highly cyclical intra-year since sales hike during the 
Christmas period and then eases on the first months of the year. For valuation proposes, as the 
forecasts are made annually the cyclicality effect is absorbed and no further adjustments have 
to be made. 
3.2. International trends 
 The 2008 crisis dragged developed countries to recession and austerity, and emerging 
countries to slower growth. Furthermore, the peripheral European countries were further 
impacted by the sovereign debt crisis, which brought more austerity, and some countries had 
to be bailed out
45
 by the IMF. Additionally, some financial institutions had to be intervened, 
and capital became scarcer and more expensive, even though the European Central Bank 
established the reference rate at historical minimums, 0,05% (See appendix III). 
With the difficult macroeconomic environment several international retailers had to optimize 
their capital and portfolio and were forced to abandon unprofitable projects to focus on core 
markets. For instance, DIA exited from Turkey, Beijing and France; Carrefour exited from 
Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Greece, among others; and Tesco sold its operations in Japan 
and USA. 
 
Exhibit 4: World trends 
Moreover, consumer habits are constantly changing. In Western Europe, the population is 
ageing, there are fewer people per household and reduced storage space, people have less 
income to spend and there are more women in the workforce; and in Emerging markets, the 
                                                          
45
 Including Greece, Portugal and Ireland. 
Hypermarkets Big High High Low Low Medium/Low
Discount Medium Very High Low Low Medium High
Convinence Small Medium High Medium Medium High Medium
Gourmet Small/Medium Low High High Low Low




Type\Focus Size Assortent Proximity
- Ageing Population - Increase of urban population - Price and Proximity stores
- Less persons per household - Rise of middle class - Health concerns
- Reduced storage space - Higher personnal costs - More demanding in fresh products
- Reduced income - Decrease of poverty - Franchisinig
- More woman on workforce - Modernising lifestyles - Innovative channels
Western Europe Emerging markets World
Trends
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urban population and middle class are increasing, and personal costs are higher. These new 
trends favor the price and proximity focused formats in deterioration of larger formats.  
Additionally, franchising is gaining share due to synergies gained between the know-how 
and purchasing power of a big retail chain, with the day to day management of an 
entrepreneur. The franchise system benefits both the franchisee, who opens a business and has 
the support of an establish retailer, and the company, by reducing the capital requirements of 
opening a store and saving some operational costs charged to the franchisee. 
Furthermore, generally speaking, people are increasingly more concerned about health issues, 
and clients became more demanding regarding fresh products. In response, retailers have 
been adapting its store concepts towards fresh and perishables such as fruit, vegetables, 
meat, fish and bakery. It is important to point out that these products bear extra costs once 
they usually have shorter expiration dates and demand special care regarding transportation 
and storage. At the same time, retailers have been investing in \ products in order to offer 
“quality at affordable prices” and “value for money” products. 
Finally, technology evolves, and with it, new and innovative distribution channels arise. 
Two examples are the “click and collect” system, which consists on ordering the shopping 
cart online and picking up the order at the store, and e-commerce, which consists in buying 
online and receiving the products at home. It is important to point out that although the online 
channel is increasing its share in the market, the majority of food products are still bought in 
store. 
3.3. Macroeconomics 
DIA is present in five countries divided in two broad groups: Iberia, which includes Portugal 
and Spain; and emerging countries, including Argentina, Brazil and China.  
In the very important appendix IV the macroeconomic environment is deeply studied, 
including the competition, in each country where DIA operates. 
To summarize, after years of downsizing its portfolios and focus on their core businesses, 
European retailers face another threat: Deflation. To face this adversity and diversify its 
portfolio, retailers are searching for new growth opportunities and investing in emerging 
markets. Nevertheless, they also have increasing risks namely hyperinflation and exchange 
rate volatility. Furthermore, accordingly to the new trends in the market discount and 
convenience are the most attractive formats. Moreover, franchising is gaining share, as 
well as private labels which are used as a way to differentiate and retain customers. Finally, 
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innovative distribution channels such as e-commerce and click and collect are gaining share 
since people are becoming more technological.  
4. The Company 
“DIA’s mission is to offer shoppers quality at unbeatable prices, to which end the company is 
inspired and abides by the following core business principles: efficiency, initiative, respect, 
teamwork and customer focus.” Source: Company data 
4.1. Overview 
DIA is an international food retailer listed on the main Spanish stock exchange, IBEX 35, 
since January 2012 after the spinoff from Carrefour on July, 2011. DIA employ more than 40 
thousand people and operates 6.707 stores
46
 located in five countries: Spain, Portugal, Brazil, 
Argentina and China. Its stores can be considered as convenient discount and value 
proximity and price. Moreover, the EBIT margin growth of 140bp since 2010 shows how 
profit driven the management team is. Additionally, DIA is expected to have sustainable 
growth opportunities since it is an active player on the consolidation of the Spanish market 
and has an increasing presence in emerging markets. 
 
Exhibit 5: DIA geographical presence. Source: Company data 
4.2. History 
DIA opened its first store in Madrid, in 1979, introducing the discount format in the Spanish 
market. Six years later, the first own branded product was introduced, followed by the 
inauguration of the first franchise store in 1989.  At the end of 1992, DIA became nationwide, 
                                                          
46
 As of September 2014. 
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operating 1,000 stores in Spain, after the acquisition of Dirsa, Mercadopopular and Ahorro 
Diario. The following year marked the start of the international expansion with the opening of 
first store in Portugal. The next couple years were of international expansion adding Greece 
and Argentina to DIA’s portfolio.  
In 1998, the loyalty card “ClubDia” was introduced. The new international expansion phase 
occurred in 1999, 2001 and 2003, entering in Turkey, Brazil and China, respectively. In the 
meanwhile DIA merged with the giant Carrefour, which was the Europe’s largest player and 
the second worldwide, and entered in France. In July 2011, DIA achieved some very 
important milestones: the spin off from Carrefour, the IPO, and consequent entry in Madrid’s 
stock exchange for a share price of €3,5. On the next, six months DIA entered in IBEX 35. 
In 2007 the company reinforced its position in Spain by acquiring Plus’ 251 stores. In 
contrast, DIA’s network in Greece was rebranded after Carrefour in 2010. DIA’s observation 
of the consumer habits resulted on adding DIA Maxi and DIA Market formats in 2006/2007 
and the DIA fresh in order to reinforce its fresh produce and perishables focus, in 2012. 
The last two years were very busy for DIA’s management team: firstly, it successfully exited 
Turkey and Beijing loss making operations in 2013 and, more recently, sold DIA France for 
an enterprise value of 600 million Euros to Carrefour; secondly, on the acquisitions side, DIA 
bought Schlecker’s Iberian operations, a proximity home and personal care (HPC) retailer 
with 1130 stores, diversifying its portfolio and improving its HPC offer. More recently the 
company closed two more deals in the fragmented Spanish market: El Árbol, a fresh product 
specialist; and 160 Eroski stores; lastly, the company issued its first five year maturity Euro 
Bond in July 2014. 
To summarize, these last transactions indicate a strategy of: 
 Focus in core markets: Iberia and Latin America; 
 Reinforcement product assortment especially in fresh produce and HPC; 
 Strong financing muscle. 
4.3. Highlights 
The transactions made in the last two years have significant impact in DIA’s operations. 
Therefore, in the next sub-section, these transactions will be closely analyzed. 
DIA Market III 
DIA is currently updating its DIA Market stores, which account for around 60% of total sales, 
from DIA Market II to DIA Market III. This way DIA is reinforcing its focus on fresh food 
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and perishables by adding in-store bakeries and improving its offer. The refurbishment costs 
around 50 thousand Euros per store and is expected to be complete in 2017. Until now the 
remodeling program has been successful with store sales increasing, on average, by 6%. 
Shlecker/Clarel:  
Schlecker’s operations were bought for 70,5 million Euros and closed in the beginning of 
2013. This way DIA added a new store concept for its portfolio and improved its home and 
personnel care offer. The more than 1.130 stores around Spain and Portugal with an average 
selling are of 150 square meters are currently being rebranded to Clarel. The process includes 
the refurbishment of the stores, to get a more modern look; the increase of SKU’s
47
 number 
offered in store and the maximization of the portfolio mix to better meet clients’ expectations. 
The remodeling process costs between 30 thousand and 40 thousand Euros per store and have 
been implemented successfully with stores remodeled increasing its sales by 8%, on average. 
Furthermore, the company expects to open 100 stores in 2014 and 150 per year from 2015 
onwards and increase its private label penetration from 19% to 30%. This acquisition enables 
DIA to diversify its portfolio and is consistent with its strategy of focus in proximity and 
price. Finally, a new Clarel store cost between 45 thousand and 60 thousand Euros and the 
first numbers are showing that this format has a higher return on investment (ROI) than 
traditional DIA’s stores. 
DIA France 
Due to DIA France poor performance with declining sales, extremely negative like-for-like 
and EBIT margin deterioration (See appendix V), DIA decided to sell its French operation to 
Carrefour for an enterprise value of 600 million Euros. The transaction was accepted by the 
anti-trust authorities in November 2014 and closed in the beginning of the following month. 
DIA received 283,2 million Euros for the sale of the entire capital plus 361,5 million Euros 
for repaying intra-group debt. This way the company showed, once more, its focus on 
profitable growth. 
El Árbol 
El Árbol’s acquisition by DIA was accepted by the anti-trust authorities and closed last 
October. This way DIA acquired 100% of the equity stake for one euro plus €26 million for a 
participative loan owned by some of El Árbol shareholders. Moreover, DIA will also take 
over El Árbol net financial debt of 99 million Euros. The total investment amounts €125 
million (See appendix VI). 
                                                          
47
 SKU=Stock keeping unit. It corresponds to the number of references/products the store offers. 
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In 2013, El Árbol had a network of 451 stores, generating €825 million in sales and EBIT 
margin of minus 2,4% . El Árbol stores are mainly located in rural areas where DIA’s store 
network is less concentrated and therefore it seems a good complement of the company’s 
network. DIA expects significant synergies arising from this transaction on the logistics, 
administrative and purchasing power levels. On one hand, the El Árbol’s negative condition 
could be reversed with implementation of DIA’s efficient processes. On the other hand, DIA 
can take advantage from El Árbol’s know how in fresh produce. 
Finally, the antitrust authorities accepted the transaction with the condition of DIA to divest in 
7 stores accounting 1,02% of 2013 total sales. 
 
Exhibit 6: El Árbol historical financials. Source: Company data 
Eroski 
DIA disclosed last November the acquisition of 160 Eroski stores for a maximum price of 
€146 million
48
 (See appendix VI). The transition is still subject of clearance from the Spanish 
competition authorities but is expected to be accepted. The stores have on average a selling 
area of 800 square meters, are mainly located in Madrid and generated 487 million Euros in 
gross sales
49
 in 2013. With this transaction DIA would increase its market share in Madrid to 
9,8%, and it nationwide market share to 9,5%
50
. In contrast with El Árbol, in the Eroski deal 
DIA is not buying any central departments and logistics centers and stores are already 
profitable. Finally, Eroski stores will be converted to DIA Maxi, DIA Market or El Árbol 
depending on their size and location. 
 
Exhibit 7: Eroski stores. Source: Company data 
Notes Issue 
Last July, 2014, DIA issued €500 Euros note, under the Euro Medium Term Note Program, 
approved by the Central Bank of Ireland. The issue matures after 5 years, pays an annual 
                                                          
48
 The final price is still subject to adjustments depending on the final number of stores. 
49
 Gross sales, in contrast with net sales, include VAT. 
50
 Source: company data. 
El Arbol P&L 2011 2012 2013
Sales 836 849 825
EBITDA 22 22 -5
% of sales 2,6% 2,6% -0,6%
EBIT 5 5 -20
% of sales 0,6% 0,6% -2,4%
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fixed coupon of 1,5% and had an issue price of 99,419% and a yield to maturity (YTM) of 
1,622%. Furthermore the company also secured a syndicated revolving credit facility with 
several financial institutions amounting 400 million Euros and for a term of 5 years. The 
amount will be used to partially cancel the current facility agreement and to provide funds for 
the Company’s operations and working capital. 
4.4. Organizational chart 
 
Exhibit 8: Organizational chart. Source: Company data 
It is important to note that the Turkish and French are already discontinued and no longer 
belong to DIA. 
4.5. The concept 
The company operates several store banners: DIA market is the neighborhood store model: 
the stores range between 400 and 700 square meters of selling area with special attention to 
perishables; the DIA fresh and fresh by DIA concepts are in the testing phase: the stores 
average 150 square meters of selling area and the idea is to turn DIA as a true specialist in 
 
 29  
Equity Valuation - DIA | Católica Lisbon 
fruit and vegetables; DIA Maxi is the largest store format with a floor are of up to 1.000 
square meters: they are mainly located in city outskirts, have some parking lots and offer a 
broader assortment; Clarel is the new home and personal care banner, which substitute the 
former Shlecker; DIA decided to maintain the El Árbol brand after its acquisition; Cada DIA 
is the retail format in small towns, particularly in rural areas, and stores are managed by a 
local entrepreneur; Mini-Preço and Mais Perto are the brands DIA operates in Portugal. 
Finally, DIA is developing a “click and collect” system with the use of a shopping website, a 
mobile phone app and more than 4.150 picking points. 
 
Exhibit 9: DIA banners. Source: Company data 
Price and proximity 
DIA aims to be leader in both the neighborhood segment, offering its clients everyday 
groceries without having to travel by car, saving money and time in the process, and in price, 
offering quality at the best price in the market. Accordingly to DIA’s 2013 annual report, the 
company has the best price image in Spain, Portugal, Brazil and Argentina.  
Fresh Focus  
DIA adapted to the new costumers demand and became more focused on fresh and perishable 
products. 
Quality private label 
DIA uses its own brand to achieve a good price image, to gain differentiated advantage and 
increase customer loyalty. The company aims to offer the same or better quality as the leader 
product with a lower price. On average more than 50% of sales are own brand products. 
Furthermore, in order to meet the requirements of a broad customer DIA’s private label 
catalogue has around 7.500 SKU’s. 
 
Exhibit 10: DIA private label brands. Source: Company data 
Loyalty program 
DIA implements its “ClubDia” loyalty card, in all countries except for Brazil, in order to offer 
immediate discount and consequently achieve a better price image. This way the company is 
able to better understand its clients’ consumer patterns and elaborate efficient and profitable 
sales plans. 
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Low cost operator 





. The result is an efficient operation which is able to further invest in 
prices. 
The franchise  
DIA divide its stores in three categories: COCO, which means company owned, company 
operated; COFO, meaning company owned, franchise operated; and FOFO, franchise owned, 
franchise operated. The weight of franchise stores in total stores increased from 30% in 2010 
to more than 50% in 2014, which shows a clear strategy of increasing the franchise network. 
 
Exhibit 11: Franchise store evolution. Source: Company data 
DIA’s franchise model consists on a cost/profit sharing between the company and the 
franchisee, resulting in a “win win” situation. On one hand, DIA supplies all the franchisee’s 
products, transferring to the latter part of the gross margin. On the other hand, the 
franchisee supports some of the operational costs. Moreover, the logistics are managed by 
the company and the franchisee pays the products “in cash”
53
 (See appendix VII). 
Furthermore the franchise stores are generally located in more rural areas and suburbs
54
 and 
the entrepreneur is usually a local residence working with his/her family in the store. 
                                                          
51
 DIA uses an integrated and optimized logistic system; multi temperature trucks and “voice-picking” 
technology. 
52
 For instance, the packaging and conditioning make products allocation easier; and, the use of bioptic scanner, 
the fact that the bar-code is in several places of the product and the optimized key board makes price reading 
faster and easier. 
53
 This way, DIA keeps its strong working capital surplus. However in the beginning of the franchisee operations 
DIA provides some credit to the entrepreneur. 
54
 Rural stores usually have less competition than stores located in the center of large cities and consequently 
higher margins. 
Percentage of Franchise stores in total stores
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DIA believes that a local entrepreneur is able to reduce costs, namely personal costs and 
“unexplained”
55




This way DIA’s franchise system allies the bargaining power and the know-how of an 
international retailer with the flexibility and entrepreneurial spirit of the franchisee. The main 
benefit for DIA is the increase EBITDA margin and for the franchisee is the opportunity to 
manage its own competitive and profitable business. 
 
Exhibit 12: Franchise margin accretive. Source: Company data 
Profitable Growth 
Finally, DIA has been steadily growing since its inception in 1975, however it does not search 
growth at any cost, which may imply closing unprofitable businesses, as it happened in 
Beijing and Turkey in 2013 and more recently with DIA France. 
4.6. SWOT 
 
Exhibit 13: SWOT analysis. Source: Own estimations 
                                                          
55
 “Unexplained” costs are for instance some inventory losses and utilities waste which as the manager is also the 
owner and the employees are usually relatives they tend to be reduced. 
56 
For example: extended opening and closing hours. 
Strenghts Weaknesses
- Attractive format: Price, Proximity & Franchise; - Dependence on the Iberia market;
- Price leadership perception; - Negative "Like-for-Like" in Iberia;
- Strong private label penetration; - Dependence on the convenience discount format;
- High margins;
Opportunities Threats
- Emerging markets growth prospects; - Deflationary environment in Iberia;
- Consolidation in the Spanish market; - Hyperinflation and decelerating growth in emerging countries;
- Clarel as a source of differentiation and growth in  new segment; - Very hostile competitive environment in Portugal;
- Exchange rate volatility;
- Loss of control over the franchisees
Swot
 
 32  
Equity Valuation - DIA | Católica Lisbon 
To summarize, DIA has an attractive store format, suitable for the world market trends; is 
present in emerging countries, which might provide good sources for growth; has been able to 
increase its margins, even in a deflationary environment; and its offer is well perceived by the 
customers. In contrast, DIA is highly depended on its Iberia operations, which are currently 
facing a competitive and deflationary environment; its emerging operations might face 
macroeconomic headwinds and with the increase share of franchise DIA might lose some 




4.7. The share 
DIA is currently trading on IBEX 35, the main Spanish stock exchange comprising the 35 
largest companies, and has 651.070.558 shares outstanding.  
 
Exhibit 14: DIA Share evolution. Source: Company data 
DIA started to be traded on Madrid’s stock exchange on fifth July 2011 at €3,4 per share. One 
month later the stock reached its historical minimum of €2,5. Moreover, the share became to 
be traded on IBEX 35 in 2012 at a share price of €3,5. On July 2, 2014, fueled by the 
company’s good performance including the successful divestment in loss making operations, 
DIA’s share reached its historical maximum of €7,1 during the day. This price implies a 
121,2% valorization since it was first traded. During the same period IBEX 35 grew 6,6% and 
the food retail index slightly decreased (-0,5%). 
                                                          
57
 There were already some situations where franchisees publicly accused DIA of enforcing them to sell products 
below cost and to have actions “less transparent”. This risk is higher in periods of difficult macroeconomic 
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Exhibit 15: DIA performance vs IBEX 35 and Food retail index. Source: Company data 
Since the historical maximum, the share decreased by 35% to a minimum of €4,6, in 16 of 
October. During the same period the food retail index slipped by 25%. This was probably due 
to general deterioration of the macroeconomic environment both in Europe, with risk of 
further deflation, and in some emerging markets, countries highly dependent on crude 
production that suffered from the sharp decrease in oil prices and in Eastern Europe, countries 
continuing to face headwinds from the Russian turmoil. Regarding DIA, it registered 
historical negative like-for-like in Iberia, of -5,6% during the second quarter and -7,1% in the 
second quarter, albeit margin increase, and, Brazil and Argentina face macroeconomic 
uncertainty, which was reflected in devaluation of their currencies pressuring its performance 
in Euros. These effects supported the negative performance of DIA’s Share during this period.  
Furthermore, its performance until the end of the year was positive with a valuation of 22% 
since the minimum in October. 
 
Exhibit 16: DIA performance per year vs IBEX 35 and Food retail index. Source: Company data 
Furthermore, DIA deeply outperformed the Spanish market and Food Retail index in 2012 
and in 2013. During 2014, the IBEX 35 had a positive performance growing 3,7% showing 
further signs of recovery while the food retail index and DIA were deeply in red, performing -
17,1% and -13,4%, respectively. This was mainly due to macroeconomic conditions of low 
inflation in Europe and macroeconomic volatility in emerging markets. 
 









































































































































DIA IBEX 35 Food Retail Index
Performance 2012 2013 2014
DIA 37,6% 35,1% -13,4%
IBEX 35 -4,7% 21,4% 3,7%
Food retail index -7,1% 15,6% -17,1%
Payment Year 2012 2013 2014
Dividend per share 0,11 0,13 0,16
% growth 18,2% 23,1%
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Finally, since the spin off, DIA distributed increasing dividends every year, and a share 
redemption of 4,16% of its capital in September 2013.  
5. The Assumptions 
During the literature review on the second section the valuation methods were analyzed and 
the author decided to use the discount cash flow as the major valuation method and the 
multiples models to increase the robustness of the results. In this section the main assumptions 
will be explained followed by the final results and conclusions on the sixth section. 
5.1. Sales 
Food retail is a volume business in which product rotation is essential in order to dilute the 
high fixed costs. Hence, understanding sales’ drivers is crucial for a good interpretation of the 
retailer’s value. 
Higher sales volume can be reached by positive “like-for-like” (LFL), corresponding to the 
year on year growth of the same stores; and expansion, which corresponds to the current year 
openings (See appendix VIII). 
On one hand, LFL is used to evaluate the performance of the current store network and is vital 
to maintain sustainable growth. This KPI
58
 is mainly driven by food inflation, GDP growth 
and competitive environment. It is also influenced by the investment in remodeling plans 
which are expected to increase sales. On the other hand, expansion factor is strictly dependent 
on investment in new stores. 
Iberia’s retail environment, including food retail, has been suffering due to the financial crisis 
of 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis in 2011. Furthermore, the 2014 year confirmed the 
increasingly DIA’s negative trend in sales like-for-like registered since the first quarter of 
2013. This decrease is greatly explained by the very low inflation, including deflation in some 
DIA’s key categories. Moreover, the situation in Portugal is poorer since it became a 
promotional driven market and highly competitive. The first two players, Sonae and Jerónimo 
Martins, are strongly investing in prices and gaining market share. In terms of expansion, the 
company opened around 221 DIA stores in the last two years corresponding to a 3,1%  annual 
average growth. 
                                                          
58
 KPI = Key performance indicator 
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Exhibit 18: DIA Iberia LFl vs Food inflation. Source: OECD iLibrary and Company data 
Regarding competition, in Spain, Carrefour managed to improve its LFL from deeply 
negative to around zero. Altough Carrefour’ LFL may have been positively affected by a 
lower denominator
59
, the negative LFL trend is a “red flag” for DIA and must be the main 
reason why investors have been bearish on DIA’s stock during 2014. Moreover it is also 
important to note that, according to the company, DIA has been consistently gaining market 
share on the spanish market despite negative LFL. In Portugal, the two main players have 
consistently overpass DIA in LFL terms since the first quarter of 2013.  
 
Exhibit 19: DIA Iberia LFl vs Competitors.  
For the future it is foreseen LFL to improve gradually as a result from the economical 
environment recovery. GDP is expected to grow in Spain and Portugal, by 1,3% and 1,0%, 
respectively, in 2014, and there are signs of food inflation to return to positive values. 
Moreover, in Portugal it is expected the levels of competition to stay high and DIA will 
probably be forced to invest more in prices to recover clients.  
Regarding expansion, DIA’s network in Iberia is already somehow crowded and the company 
estimates cannibalization to have a negative impact of 1% in Spain
60
. Therefore, after the 
acquisitions of El Árbol and Eroski stores, it is expected the company to ease store openings. 
                                                          
59
 Carrefour LFL has been decreasing during the last years which makes the denominator (sales from the year 
before, smaller which may have a positive effect on this year’s LFL. 
60
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Moreover the two acquisition recently made are expected to impact DIA’s consolidate 
accounts in 2015 with an increase in sales of around €1.150 million.  
Regarding Clarel, it is expected sales to increase substantially from the positive impact of 
stores remodeling and expansion. Furthermore Clarel is less vulnerable to food inflation 
which might be positive for its growth. 
 
Exhibit 20: DIA Iberia - Sales and Store evolution. Source: Company data and Own estimations 
In emerging countries the picture is substantially different with strong positive LFL growth
61
 
and expansion rates. The headwind in emerging countries has been the negative effect of the 
exchange rates, especially in 2014 and more particularly in Argentina. Regarding how to 
manage the exchange effect, the author made two important assumptions: first, in the long 
run, accordingly to the purchasing power parity, the currency effect should only reflect 
differences between local inflation and the German inflation, used as the European 
benchmark; secondly, periods of hyperinflation or deep recession have a negative impact 
on the currency, due to higher uncertainty about the future of the country. 
As the three countries are significantly different among them, they should be analyzed 
separately.  
Accordingly to the uncertainty environment lived in Argentina it is expected high inflation, 
low or even negative GDP real growth and negative exchange rate effect. The result is: high 
LFL evolution and low growth in Euro terms. After the period of high inflation and 
devaluation of the Argentinean peso it is expected the levels of inflation to ease to historical 
values, and sales in Euro terms to increase. It is also important to note that DIA is currently 
growing its sales above inflation levels
62
, demonstrating a solid operation despite the 
macroeconomic environment.  
                                                          
61
 LFL in emerging countries is calculated using local currency 
62
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Exhibit 21: DIA Argentina - Sales and Store evolution. Source: Company data and Own estimations 
In Brazil, inflation is above the 4,5% government’s target including food inflation which is 
constantly higher then overall inflation. If inflation is good news for food retailers because it 
should help like-for-like growth, at the same time, the economy is stagnating and the 
Brazilian Real has been devaluating against the Euro, negatively affecting DIA’s sales in 
2014. For the future it is estimated the economy to recover to levels around 3% of GDP 
growth and a gradual declining of inflation levels to government’s target. This way prices 
might decelerate but sales should be helped by an increase of volumes due to higher 
disposable income. Moreover the exchange effect should be softer in the future. 
 
Exhibit 22: DIA Brazil - Sales and Store evolution. Source: Company data and Own estimations 
The operation in China is residual for the total group but both sales and store expansion have 
been witnessing double digit growth which suggests that the company is investing on this 
market. Although the recent deceleration of the economy, China is still forecasted to grow at 
levels above 7% for the next two years and above 6% in the medium term which should result 
in increasing disposal household income and consequently benefiting the retail market. 
Moreover inflation has been stable around 2,5% and food inflation has been above the overall 
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Exhibit 23: DIA China - Sales and Store evolution. Source: Company data and Own estimations 
Furthermore, using Carrefour and Casino
63
 operations in Latin America to benchmark DIA’s 
performance, it suggests DIA is outperforming its competitors, reinforcing the idea that the 
company operates a solid store network in emerging countries. 
 
Exhibit 24: DIA emerging markets LFL vs Competitors. 
To summarize, emerging markets are without doubt a source of growth and DIA has been 
showing very healthy sales like-for-like and double digit expansion growth. Despite 
temporary macroeconomic challenges it is expected DIA to continue investing on these 
markets.  
 
Exhibit 25: DIA emerging markets sales evolution. Source: Company data and own estimations 
                                                          
63
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5.2. Cost of goods sold 
The cost of goods sold (COGS) is the largest expense in the food retail business and is one of 
the reasons why critical mass is so important: to gain bargaining power with suppliers. There 
are three main drivers for the COGS: the above mention, bargaining power; investment on 
prices; and franchises. The first one is closely linked to the economies of scale concept, “the 
more you buy, the cheaper it gets”. With the sale of the French operations, DIA will lose sales 
volume and consequently bargaining power, however, this should be recovered with the 
acquisition of El Árbol and Eroski stores. Regarding investment in price, DIA is already 
recognized as the price leader in most of its markets, which suggest that the current gross 
profit margin has already this investment incorporated. Furthermore, franchising growth 
should have a negative impact over the gross profit since DIA “share” part of the margin with 
the franchisees; however DIA has been able to maintain or even grow the margin, with the 
exception of  2014, suggesting that the impact should be marginal. To conclude, the author 
estimated the gross margin to decrease (20bp) in 2014, reflecting the trend verified on the 
third quarter and a second decrease of another 20bp in the long run due to the increased 
weighted of franchisees. 
  
Exhibit 26: Gross profit margin evolution. Source: Company data and own estimations 
Furthermore, there is no information decomposing Iberia’s and emerging markets gross profit 
for which it was assumed to be equal in both regions. 
5.3. Operating expenses (Opex) 
As a low cost operator, DIA is constantly looking to “cut fat” out of the company. As result 
operating expenses decreased 100bp from 2010 to 2012. Although in 2013 the operating 
expenses, as percentage of sales, increased from 15,1% to 15,5%, this was due to lower sales 
per store and per square meter, not from an increase in costs. Moreover, it is important to take 
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which are, at least in the short term, fixed assets. This way it is very important to generate 
sales and dilute these high fixed costs.  
Furthermore, the cost improvement DIA has been able to attain was not only due to efficiency 
improvements but also from the highest share of franchise operation which, as it was 
exemplified in section 4.5., reduces DIA’s costs and result in higher EBIT margins. DIA has 
been able to reduce other operating costs, including utilities and logistics which are included 
on the item “other operating expenses”. Moreover, during the first nine months of 2014, 
operating costs decreased from 15,8% to 14,7% mainly due to DIA France operation 
considered as discontinued (See appendix IX).  
  
Exhibit 27: Opex evolution. Source: Company data and own estimations 
In Iberia EBITDA margins have been increasing consistently from 7,6% in 2010 to 9,6% in 
2013. This was due to the above mentioned aspects: increasing contribution of franchise 
stores and operating efficiencies. For the future, the margin is expected to maintain since both 
franchise expansion and efficiencies are getting to a limit
64
.  
In contrast, it is expected slow margin expansion in emerging markets, hence stores get to 
maturity and DIA reaches critical volumes on those countries, as a contrary effect the fast rate 
of expansion might slowdown the margin expansion
65
. 
Regarding the new businesses, Clarel is expected to have a margin of 10% in the long run. El 
Árbol is expected to have a negative impact on 2015 EBITDA of -2%, reach breakeven in 
2017 and gradually improve until the reaches DIA’s original stores margin. Finally Eroski, in 
contrast with El Árbol, is expected to have an accretive impact of 3% in 2015 and gradually 
converge to original Iberia’s store margin. 
                                                          
64
 The company cannot have only franchise stores because it would risk losing control over the operations. In 
addition, stores located in large cities will strategically be owned by the company since typically, franchise 
synergies in these locations are lower. 
65
 Expansion deteriorates the margin since stores have lower margins during the first years of operation. 
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Exhibit 28: EBITDA evolution. Source: Company data and own estimations 
5.4. Capital expenditures (Capex) and depreciations 
Food retail is a capital intensive business hence capital expenditures are indispensable for 
growth and are a function of acquisitions, store opening and remodeling programs.  
Regarding acquisitions, DIA closed two deals: one of €125 million to be paid in 2014, related 
to El Árbol’s acquisition, and another of €146 million in 2015, related to Eroski stores 
acquisition. Moreover, DIA has an aggressive expansion plan for Clarel and in emerging 
countries with double digit growth rates during the next years which are then expected to 
ease.  
In Iberia the majority of the CAPEX is estimated to be allocated for remodeling as the market 
becomes saturated and stores need refurbishment to maintain company’s standards. 
Furthermore, remodeling is essential to adapt stores to new purchasing habits and 
consequently maintain or even increase sales in the future. According to the company, the 
annual capex for the next years should be around €350 million. 
Depreciations are computed as a percentage of previous year gross property plant and 
equipment (PPE) using the depreciation rate of 2013 (8%).  
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Furthermore, the PPE is computed using the following formula: 
                                            66 
 
Exhibit 31: Capital expenditures evolution. Source: Company data and own estimations 
The exponential increase in Iberia’s capex in 2014 and 2015 is due to the acquisition of El 
Árbol and Eroski stores (See appendix X). It is also important to note that the investment 
needed in Emerging markets per square meter is lower than in Iberia which results in a high 
growth of stores with a relatively low investment. 
In the long run the CAPEX should be used as replacement investment on assets in order to 
keep store’s minimum standards. For this reason in the long run capex will be equal to the 
level of depreciations and growth should be driven only by same stores sales. 
5.4. Goodwill 
The author assumed that the above mentioned transactions will not generate any goodwill and 
the value paid is equal to the book value of the property plant and equipment. Furthermore the 
Goodwill is expected to decrease by €146 million due to the sale of DIA France and to be 
stable thereafter. 
5.5. Net Working Capital 
The net working capital is function of three variables: the days in payables (DPO)
67
, the days 
in receivables (DSO)
68
 and the days in inventory (DIO)
69
. In contrast with the majority of the 
other industries, net working capital has a positive effect on the food retail business. This is 
due to the industry’s main characteristics: long payable conditions and sales in cash. This way 
the retailer is usually able to receive the money from the sale of a product before it pays the 
supplier’s bill.  
                                                          
66
 It was assumed that the company sells totally depreciated assets every year on the amount of current year’s 
depreciation. 
67
 Trade Payables Cost of Goods Sold  365 
68
 Trade Receivables  et Sales  365 
69
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Moreover, with the abovementioned variables constant, the net working capital becomes a 
function of the level of sales. This way sales growth will have a positive impact in net 
working capital, increasing the value of the company, and vice versa. Therefore, the sale of 
the DIA France will have a negative impact on working capital needs while the acquisition of 
El Árbol and Eroski will generate the opposite effect. 
Furthermore, despite of cash sales both from the end user and the franchisees DIA gives credit 
for the franchisee’s start up costs, and that is way receivables are small but positive. 
DIA has been able to keep its trading conditions virtually stable and the days in payables and 
days in inventory were calculated as an average from the last four years of operation. Since 
receivables are a function of franchise stores this item was adjusted to DIA France exit with 
data from DIA’s third quarter release, which explains the increase of the DIO from8 to 10 
days. In the long run, it is expected the franchise sales to follow the same pattern as the 
groups sales and therefore the DIO ratio will be stable. 
 
Exhibits 32 and 33: Working capital evolution. Source: Company data and own estimations 
Due to the lack of information the author assumed that the working capital conditions are the 
same for both segments. 
5.6. Debt, cash and interest payments 
Regarding debt, DIA issued a €500 million Euro bond last July with a fixed coupon of 1,5% 
and a maturity of five years. Moreover, it raised a syndicate loan amounting €400 million for 
a term of five years. These two funding sources were used to repay old debt and finance 
DIA’s operations. Moreover, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have assigned to DIA a long-
term corporate rating of Baa3 and BBB-, respectively, with a stable outlook. The credit 
ratings were used in order to calculate DIA’s spread over the risk free, resulting in an interest 
rate of 2,3%. 
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Debt was computed using the cash flows generated by the company. Furthermore, the 
company has a target net debt
70
 to EBITDA ratio between 0,9 times to 1,1 times. However, in 
2014 it is expected net debt to be temporarily below the lower target because of the proceeds 
from DIA France, and temporally above target in 2015 due to the payment of Eroski’s 
acquisition. 
Moreover, as DIA becomes a “cash cow” and generates substantial operating cash flow, it 
will accumulate cash and according to the model the net debt will be below target in 2019 
onwards. However, since cash excess cash accumulated on the balance sheet don’t create 
value and the company as a target net debt to EBITDA it might be expected that DIA will 
adjust its debt level. Consequently the author believes that the company might return its 
excess cash to shareholders in form of extraordinary dividends or share buyback. Moreover 
the company has on its historical accounts the distribution of extraordinary dividends in 2010 
and 2011 amounting €369 million and €532 million, respectively. 
Furthermore interests are compute using the following formula 
                                           71 
  
Exhibit 34: Net debt. Source: Company data and own estimations 
Note: it was assumed that the company will use debt sources to repay the current debt. 
5.7. Equity 
Equity was calculated using the following formula: 
                                                                                      
DIA distributes, by policy, between 45% and 50% of its underlying net profit. Moreover, as 
the company is expected to generate substantial amount of operating cash, the author assumed 
                                                          
70
 Net Debt = Gross Debt – Cash and Cash Equivalents 
71
 It was assumed that, since the company as a target net debt to EBITDA, the risk of the company to cover its 
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that the company will distribute 75% of its underlying net profit as dividends from 2017 
onwards. 
                                                                                             
5.8. Other items 
“Associated companies” were related with DIA France and are estimated to be zero after its 
disposal. 
 “Discontinued operations” are related to DIA France and are expected to be zero from 2015 
onwards. 
“Minority interests” were related with DIA Turkey which as the transaction is complete this 
item it is expected to be zero. 
5.9. Scenarios 
In order to incorporate additional macroeconomic risks, several scenarios were idealized and 
the impact was estimated. This way the author not only incorporated macroeconomic risks in 
the valuation but also provides valuable information on how the firm might be affected to 
external factors. 
5.9.1. Deflation in Iberia 
In 2014, Iberia witnessed deflation, particularly in food items, reaching -1,7% in Spain and -
2,8% in Portugal, on the third quarter.
.
 The expected economical recovery might have a 
positive impact on consumption, and inflation is anticipated to gradually recover to target 
levels, around 1,5%. However, Europe is expected to witness low levels of growth and 
projections have been revised downwards by analysts and government institutions. This way, 
it is possible that Europe, and Iberia in particular, would take more than expected to recover 
and deflation could be a reality on the coming years.  
To summarize, in this scenario sales would decrease substantially, pressuring margins down, 
capex is the same, since openings are reduced and the remodeling and substitution investment 
is still necessary, and working capital will be negatively affected by diminished sales.  
Finally, after two years of deep deflation the scenario foresees a gradual convergence to the 
base scenario in the long run. The author considered the probability of a deflationary scenario 
of 25% which is in line with the international authorities estimates (See appendix XI). 
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5.9.2. Hyperinflation and recession in emerging markets 
Emerging countries are good sources of growth and opportunities however they also carry 
substantially more uncertainty and risk. In this environment the economy is very volatile and 
the risk of a slowdown is always present. 
Currently, inflation in Argentina is very high and risk of hyperinflation
72
 is present, in Brazil 
inflation is higher than the government’s target, but relatively low comparing to Argentina.  In 
contrast, China has low sustainable inflation. Furthermore, Brazil faced negative GDP growth 
on the first two quarters of 2014. Regarding Argentina, the IMF alerted that data published by 
the government may not be reliable and private institutions estimate real GDP growth to be 
negative in the short run. 
Taking into account this adverse macroeconomic environment the scenario projects a 
deterioration of the economic indicators. Consequently, it is estimated a similar trend for the 
Argentinean economy as it happened during the 2002 crisis. This way inflation would 
increase above 40% during the next 18 months. Moreover GDP would decrease and the 
Argentinean Peso would sharply devaluate. Furthermore the impact on the other geographies 
is expected to be softer as risks are lower. Brazil would expect inflation around 15% and 
slightly negative GDP and china around 7% with decelerated growth.  
The effects would be: very high LFL due to hyperinflation, negative real growth and 
exponential devaluation of the currency as the risk of the countries sharply increase and its 
financial health deteriorates. Moreover, margins would decrease because the company 
would not be able to completely charge the inflation to clients and the company would delay 
some of its investment resulting in lower capex and openings. 
Finally, the author considered a probability of 50% for this scenario since the macroeconomic 
context in the countries analyzed is blurred and volatile and the risks of hyperinflation and 
recession are present in the current environment. 
 
Exhibit 35: Summary of the alternative scenarios. Source: Own estimations 
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 Hyperinflation corresponds to periods of extremely high inflation levels 
Scenario Deflation Hyperinflation and Recession
LFL -- ++
Expansion = -




Working Capital - -
Sales per store - -
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6. The Valuation 
In this section, the results from the valuation approaches are presented and a sensitivity 
analysis is performed. 
6.1. Discount cash flow model 
The author decided to use the sum of parts approach dividing DIA’s operations in two 
segments: Iberia, comprising Portugal and Spain; and Emerging markets, including 
Argentina, Brazil and China. Furthermore, weighed scenarios where used to incorporate 
additional risk.  
6.1.1. The discount factor 
The discount factor used was based on the current market conditions, the return demanded by 
an international investor, DIA’s historical capital ratio and tax expectations. This way the 
return on equity computed was 6,9%, the cost of debt 2,3% and the equity ratio assumed to be 
80% resulting in a weighted average cost of capital of 5,8% (See appendix XII). 
6.1.2. The model 
Taking into account all the operational assumptions and the macroeconomic scenarios, Iberia 
is estimated to value €4.521 million while Emerging markets have an enterprise value of 
€1.086 million for a total value of €5.607 million. 
Furthermore, it was used an explicit period of 10 years in order to provide detailed forecasts 
until DIA’s operations reach maturity. To compute the terminal value a growth rate of 0,6% 
was used for Iberia and 2,0% for emerging markets, both reflecting the expected long term 
like-for-like growth (See the estimated balance sheet, income statement and cash flow 
statement in XIII and the impact of DIA France in appendix XIV). 
 
Exhibit 36: Iberia base scenario forecasts. Source: Own estimations 
75%
Iberia 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e Prepertuity
EBIT*(1-Tax) 219 227 235 241 253 269 283 294 301 305
Less: Capex 366 221 216 216 210 204 202 200 195 196
Plus: D&A 170 186 188 191 193 194 195 195 196 196
Less: NWC -86 -19 -2 0 -1 -2 -3 -3 -4 -4
FCFF 108 211 210 216 237 260 279 293 306 309 5 947
Discount factor 1,06 1,12 1,19 1,25 1,33 1,40 1,49 1,57 1,66 1,76 1,76
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Exhibit 37: Iberia deflationary scenario forecasts. Source: Own estimations 
 
Exhibit 38: Emerging markets base scenario forecasts. Source: Own estimations 
 
Exhibit 39: Emerging markets hyperinflation scenario forecasts. Source: Own estimations 
 
Exhibits 40 and 41: Summary of the valuation output. Source: Own estimations 
Non equity claims and adjustments 
As explained during the literature review to get the equity value the non equity claims must be 
subtracted from the enterprise value. This way the net debt amounts €543 million and 
provisions
73
 €61 million.  
Furthermore, the company considers some costs related to the remodeling processes
74
 as non-
recurring. However, since it is related to operations and the costs are predicted to be incurred 
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 “Provisions” are related with the employee long term benefit plan and tax contingencies. 
74
 For example, costs of closing the store while the remodeling process takes place. 
25%
Iberia 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e Prepertuity
EBIT*(1-Tax) 122 85 86 89 108 133 145 169 181 186
Less: Capex 366 221 216 216 210 204 202 200 195 196
Plus: D&A 170 186 188 191 193 194 195 195 196 196
Less: NWC -77 29 16 8 3 1 0 -1 -2 -3
FCFF 3 21 43 56 87 122 138 166 184 189 3 648
Discount factor 1,06 1,12 1,19 1,25 1,33 1,40 1,49 1,57 1,66 1,76 1,76




Emerging Markets 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2020e 2020e 2020e 2020e Prepertuity
EBIT*(1-Tax) 26 29 33 38 44 56 65 74 87 87
Less: Capex 154 160 155 153 152 153 143 139 128 103
Plus: D&A 53 61 69 76 82 88 93 97 100 103
Less: NWC -23 -31 -34 -32 -30 -27 -26 -19 -15 -10
FCFF -52 -39 -19 -7 4 17 41 52 74 97 2 589
Discount factor 1,06 1,12 1,19 1,25 1,33 1,40 1,49 1,57 1,66 1,76 1,76




Emerging Markets 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2020e 2020e 2020e 2020e Prepertuity
EBIT*(1-Tax) 7 4 8 13 18 20 26 32 41 47
Less: Capex 125 125 137 152 156 141 130 124 120 96
Plus: D&A 53 59 64 70 77 83 88 91 94 96
Less: NWC 6 5 -12 -24 -27 -20 -17 -13 -11 -8
FCFF -71 -67 -52 -45 -34 -18 0 13 26 54 1 447
Discount factor 1,06 1,12 1,19 1,25 1,33 1,40 1,49 1,57 1,66 1,76 1,76
Disounted cash flow -67 -60 -44 -36 -26 -13 0 8 16 31 822
Hyperinflation and Recession Scenario
Probability:
Perpetual Growth 0,6% Perpetual Growth 2,0%
Wacc 5,8% Wacc 5,8%
100% Enterprise Value 4 521 100% Enterprise Value 1 086
75% Base Scenario 5 114 50% Base Scenario 1 541
25% Deflationary Scenario 2 742 50% Hyperinflation Scenario 631
# Shares 645 # Shares 645
100% Price 7,00 100% Price 1,68
75% Base Scenario 7,92 50% Base Scenario 2,39
25% Deflationary Scenario 4,25 50% Hyperinflation Scenario 0,98
Iberia Emerging Markets
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while remodeling processes are in place, the author considered these costs on the valuation 
until 2017, when current remodeling programs are expected to be finalized. Moreover, 
although it is expected remodeling programs after 2017
75
, since the benefits from those 
operations are not incorporated on the valuation, these costs are considered to be as zero from 
2018 onwards. Finally, these costs are expected to have a €99 million impact on the valuation.  
Share price 
Finally to get the price per share the equity value was divided by 645 million shares 
outstanding. The final share price of €7,60 Euros implies a 36% potential upside and 
consequently a Buy recommendation. 
 
Exhibit 42: Summary of the valuation output. Source: Own estimations 
6.2. Sensitivity analysis 
In order to stress test the model three sensitivity analyses were made. 
Firstly, the WACC was stress tested and the author concluded that the model is extremely 
sensitive to changes in this variable. A 100bp reduction on the discount rate would lead to an 
increase on the share price of 37% while a decrease on the same amount would make the 
share price drop by 22% to €5,89. Moreover, the value of the company is more sensitive with 
declining discount rate than with increases.  
 
Exhibit 43: Sensitivity test - WACC. Source: Own estimations 
Secondly, since the terminal value accounts for 74,8% of the total enterprise value it is 
important to run a sensitivity analysis on the terminal growth. For this purpose, a double entry 
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 During the third quarter conference call, the company stated that is studying a remodeling program regarding 
the Maxi stores. 
Enterprise Value Iberia 4 521
Enterprise Value Emerging Markets 1 086







Price at December 31, 2014 5,6
Potential Upside 36%
Rating Buy
Wacc 4,3% 4,8% 5,3% 5,8% 6,3% 6,8% 7,3%
Price (€) 12,44 10,38 8,85 7,60 6,69 5,89 5,23
Impact 64% 37% 16% 0,0% -12% -22% -31%
WACC
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table was built to analyze the impact of both the emerging market and Iberia segments. It can 
be concluded that, as it was expected, Iberia has a greater impact than emerging market. 
Furthermore, although the impact of the terminal growth is smoother than the impact of 
WACC, a decrease of 60bp on Iberia’s growth combined with a decrease of 100bp in 
emerging markets would make the share price drop 11,7% to €6,71. 
 
Exhibit 44: Sensitivity test – terminal growth. Source: Own estimations 
Thirdly, a sensitivity test on the margins was also made and it can be concluded that the 
valuation is significantly affected by this variable. Therefore, it is extremely important to be 
able to manage an efficient store network. 
 
Exhibit 45: Sensitivity test – EBITDA margins. Source: Own estimations
76
 
To conclude, the model is sensible to discount rate, terminal value growth and margin 
changes. Therefore, it is extremely important to understand the market and its involving 
variables in order to make accurate estimations. A small change in the assumptions have a 
exponential impact on the valuation. 
6.3. Multiples  
To build the peer group Bloomberg’s food retail players were used as a starting point from 
which three filters were taken into account: geographical presence in both, developed 
countries and emerging markets, particularly in Latin America; store format focused on 
convenience discount; and similar fundamentals such as EBITDA margins, return on 
invested capital (ROIC), long term earnings per share growth, capital structure, and historical 
growth rates. This way the author benchmarked food retailers with seven indicators in order to 
find a reasonable peer group (See appendix XV). 
A peer group of 9 companies was then constructed from which 5 companies were excluded: 
Magnit and O’key because they only operate in Russia; Tesco because of the recently 
accounting fraud; and Casino Group and Companhia Brasileira de Distribuição because 
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 pp = percentage points. 
1,0% 6,71 7,21 7,63 8,25
1,5% 6,87 7,38 7,80 8,42
2,0% 7,08 7,60 8,01 8,63
2,5% 7,36 7,88 8,29 8,91





EBITDA margin change -1,0 pp -0,5 pp 0,0 pp 0,5 pp 1,0 pp
Price (€) 5,32 6,46 7,60 8,74 9,88
Impact -30% -15% 0% 15% 30%
EBITDA Margins
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almost 50% of their operations are related to other activities rather than food retail. At the 
end, a final peer group of 4 companies was used to benchmark DIA. 
 
Exhibit 46: Peer group. Source: Own estimations 
The following conclusions can be taken from the multiple analyses: firstly, price earnings 
multiples, suggest that DIA is trading at a small discount over its peers while EV/EBIT and 
EV/EBITDA multiples suggest the contrary; secondly, it would be normal that, in a growing 
company, the 2015 multiples to be lower than the 2014
77
, however DIA’s 2014 and 2015 
multiples are quite similar which suggest that the profitability margins, in absolute values, 
won’t increase in 2015. This is due to the acquisition of both the Eroski stores, which are 
expected to have lower margins in the short term, and El Árbol which is expected to have a 
negative impact on the EBITDA. Since this impact is temporary, and margins from the stores 
acquired are expected to improve with the implementation of DIA’s efficient model, the 
author considers that 2015 multiples may be distorted and should not be taken into account for 
valuation purposes; thirdly, the multiples suggest that DIA is fairly priced in the market since 
the average share price is €5,73 and the company was traded at €5,68 in December 30, 2014. 
However, if only 2014 multiples were taken into account, multiples may suggest that DIA is 
slightly undervalued, €6,06 vs €5,68. 
Furthermore, the DCF model outputs a significantly higher valuation than the multiple 
analyses. This suggests that the market may be bearish on the stock or bearish in the food 
retail market as a whole. By analyzing the food retail index
78
 performance since January 
2008, it reached a seven year minimum on October 24, 2014
79
 (See appendix XVI). 
Moreover, the author is more optimistic than the market, regarding the food retail market and 
expects the recovery of the European economy and inflation levels to fuel retailers. Regarding 
DIA, the author believes it should be traded at a premium comparing to its European peers 
based on its impeccable margin’s track record and efficient operation. In accordance, the 
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 In a growing company it is expected that the denominator (earnings, EBIT and EBITDA) to increase year on 
year which, by having the same nominator, the future multiples should be considerably smaller than current 
ones. 
78
 Bloomberg ticket: BEFOODR. 
79
 Note: the author used weekly frequency. 
Market Cap (€ Million) P/E 2014 P/E 2015 EV/EBITDA 2014 EV/EBITDA 2015 EV/EBIT 2014 EV/EBIT 2015
Ahold 13 107 16,5 14,5 7,1 6,8 12,0 11,4
Jerónimo Martins 5 185 15,6 15,3 8,0 7,7 12,7 12,6
Colruyt 6 020 17,0 16,5 8,3 8,2 11,6 11,7
Carrefour 18 428 16,4 14,2 6,9 6,4 11,0 10,2
Harmonic Average 8 171 16,3 15,1 7,5 7,2 11,8 11,4
DIA 3 724 14,8 14,5 8,0 7,9 12,3 12,6
DIA's implied share price (€) 6,27 5,65 5,84 5,44 5,99 5,17
Average (€) 5,73
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analysts’ consensus suggests an appreciation of DIA’s stock and rates it as a buy opportunity, 
above its European peers (See appendix XVII). 
Valuation drawbacks 
It is important to note that there is no perfect peer group and from the initial group of 22 
companies only four were chosen as similar. Furthermore, from the seven indicators the 
author used to benchmark the peer group, only one company had more than four similar 
characteristics.  
7. Comparison with Morgan Stanley 
In order to compare this paper’s results with a leading investment bank report, a research note 
from Morgan Stanley published on November 12, 2014, was chosen. 
This report was chosen because: firstly, Morgan Stanley is a global leader in the investment 
banking industry; secondly, as it was published on November 12, it includes the third 
quarter results and the acquisition of 160 Eroski stores; thirdly, the research note has an 
explicit period of nine years (vs ten years on the thesis); lastly it provides detailed 
information regarding the forecasts including the discrimination between Iberia and 
emerging markets. 
Furthermore, Morgan Stanley established a target price per share of €5,6 and a consequent 
equal-weight recommendation
80
. The share price on November 11,2014, was €5,21. 
7.1. Valuation methodology 
The first significant difference between the two research notes rise from the methodology 
used. Although, both used the discount cash flow and the weighted average cost of capital as 
the discount factor, the author incorporated the risk on the cash flows, with weighted 
scenarios, while Morgan Stanley’s analyst used the discount factor. Therefore, the discount 
rates are significantly different. The main difference is the risk free rate estimation (0,7% vs 
5%). The author found no reason why Morgan Stanley’s risk free rate estimation is so high 
once the currency used is Euros, the 10 year German Bund is below 1% and the 10 year 
Spanish government bonds are around 2%. 
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 An equal-weight recommendation corresponds to an Hold recommendation and suggests the price in the 
market is close to the fair value of the company taking into account current information and macroeconomic 
environment expectations. 
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Exhibit 47: WACC comparison with Morgan Stanley. Source: Own estimations and Morgan Stanley 
report 
7.2. Main assumptions 
The main cash flow assumptions differ significantly between the investment bank and the 
thesis.  
 




Regarding sales, thesis’ assumptions were considerably more conservative than the 
investment banker, especially in Iberia. In the author’s view, DIA’s operations in Iberia are 
reaching maturity and the store network is already extremely dense. Therefore it estimated 
that, after the integration of El Árbol and Eroski stores, the company will ease store openings 
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 The numbers presented on the thesis line correspond to the weighted scenario. 
Thesis Morgan Stanley Variation
Cost of equity 6,9% 8,6% -1,7 pp
Risk Free 0,7% 5,0% -4,3 pp
Beta 1,1 0,9 0,2
Market risk premium 5,5% 4,0% 1,5 pp
Wacc 5,8% 8,0% -2,2 pp
2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e
Sales
Thesis 8 718 8 909 9 120 9 379 9 666 9 913 10 153 10 344 10 514
Morgan Stanley 8 939 9 465 9 982 10 584 11 193 11 804 12 414 13 021 13 620
Variation -2,5% -5,9% -8,6% -11,4% -13,6% -16,0% -18,2% -20,6% -22,8%
EBIT
Thesis 295 280 295 309 336 370 400 430 456
Margin 3,4% 3,1% 3,2% 3,3% 3,5% 3,7% 3,9% 4,2% 4,3%
Morgan Stanley 383 399 406 401 420 438 456 474 490
Margin 4,3% 4,2% 4,1% 3,8% 3,8% 3,7% 3,7% 3,6% 3,6%
Variation -0,9 pp -1,1 pp -0,8 pp -0,5 pp -0,3 pp 0,0 pp 0,3 pp 0,5 pp 0,7 pp
Depreciation
Thesis 223 246 255 264 272 279 285 289 293
Morgan Stanley 204 216 228 242 268 300 334 372 412
Variation 9,4% 13,8% 11,9% 9,0% 1,5% -6,9% -14,6% -22,2% -28,9%
Change in WC
Thesis 92 20 21 26 28 24 24 19 17
Morgan Stanley 57 40 38 48 50 53 56 59 61
Variation 60,9% -50,3% -45,2% -46,5% -43,0% -53,9% -57,4% -68,0% -72,3%
CAPEX
Thesis 360 364 362 368 364 352 339 331 319
Morgan Stanley 380 410 443 479 474 468 461 453 444






Thesis 20 110 133 150 185 226 265 293 325
Morgan Stanley -7 129 111 111 157 209 263 321 383
Variation -392,5% -14,5% 20,1% 35,0% 17,5% 7,9% 0,6% -8,7% -15,0%
Free cash flow discounted
Thesis 19 98 112 119 139 161 178 186 196
Morgan Stanley -6 110 88 82 107 132 154 174 192
Variation -422,6% -10,5% 27,8% 45,7% 29,9% 21,7% 15,6% 7,1% 1,9%
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and grow at the LFL levels. Therefore the author did not find any reason for sales in Iberia to 
grow at around 4%. 
 
Exhibit 49: Sales Iberia comparison with Morgan Stanley. Source: Own estimations and Morgan Stanley 
report 
In emerging markets, although sales forecasts are similar, the analyst foresees a greater 
amount of openings which result in a sharp decrease in sales per square meter
82
. In the 
author’s opinion lower sales per square meter are understandable hence the macroeconomic 
environment is not favorable, however it considers the values to be undervalued by the 
investment bank. 
 
Exhibit 50: Emerging markets sales per sqm comparison with Morgan Stanley. Source: Own estimations 
and Morgan Stanley report 
In order to support the sales increase, Morgan Stanley analyst estimated significantly higher 
capital expenditures. However, according with the company capex is expect to stand around 
€350 million. Therefore the author did not agree with the extremely high investment 
forecasted by the investment bank.  
 
Exhibit 51: Capex comparison with Morgan Stanley. Source: Own estimations and Morgan Stanley report 
Moreover, despite of higher capex, depreciations are lower on the analyst model during the 
first 6 years of the explicit period. After which depreciations become exponentially higher. 
This is due to a lower depreciation rate, which delays depreciations from the new investments. 
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 The author was not able to compute Morgan Stanley’s Iberia sales per square meter due to lack of information. 
2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
Sales Iberia
Thesis 5 953 6 142 6 166 6 165
Morgan Stanley 6 075 6 396 6 642 6 901
Variation -2,0% -4,0% -7,2% -10,7%







2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
Morgan Stanley Thesis Base Scenario Thesis Hyperinflation Scenario
2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e
CAPEX
Thesis 360 364 362 368 364 352 339 331 319
Morgan Stanley 380 410 443 479 474 468 461 453 444
Variation -5,4% -11,3% -18,4% -23,1% -23,2% -24,9% -26,5% -26,8% -28,1%
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The author could not find any reason for this, since the depreciation rate has been quite stable 
around 8% of gross property plant and equipment. 
 
Exhibit 52: Depreciations comparison with Morgan Stanley. Source: Own estimations and Morgan 
Stanley report 
Regarding EBITDA margin evolution, Morgan Stanley analyst forecasts a 230bp decrease in 
Iberia’s margin while the thesis’ base scenario assumes a slightly decrease (20bp) from 9,8% 
to 9,6% on DIA’s original stores in Spain
83
. On the deflationary scenario the author forecasted 
a margin decrease of 280bp in 2016 and a gradual recovery until it reaches the long term 
margin. Therefore the weighted scenario incorporates only a slight decrease in margin. 
DIA has been able to increase its margins despite the deflationary pressure. The analyst’s 
argument to support the sharp decrease in margins is based on the fact that DIA’s current 
margin increase with negative “like-for-like” evolution is not sustainable. However, the 
company explains the margin increase with its historical success in reducing their cost base 
through efficiency gains and the increasing share of franchise. In addition, it is important to 
note that DIA has little exposure to typically margin dilutive categories such as fuel and 
tobacco, for which the current margins might not be as high as some analysts argue. To 
conclude, the author believes that the deflationary pressure will ease with the economical 
recovery and therefore the company will be able to maintain current margins in the future. 
Moreover, both reports estimate a gradual increase on the emerging markets margin. It is also 
important to note that Iberia margins will be negatively impacted by the acquisitions of El 
Árbol and Eroski which fully explains thesis’ 2015 margin decrease. 
 
Exhibit 53: EBITDA margin comparison with Morgan Stanley. Source: Own estimations and Morgan 
Stanley report 
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 DIA’s original stores in Iberia excludes El Árbol and Eroski acquisitions 
2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
Thesis base scenario PPE 2 789 3 086 3 220 3 334 3 436
Depreciation 200 223 247 258 267
% Depreciation/PPE(T-1) 8,0% 8,0% 8,0% 8,0%
Thesis weighted scenario PPE 2 789 3 072 3 190 3 296 3 401
Depreciation 200 223 246 255 264
% Depreciation/PPE(T-1) 8,0% 8,0% 8,0% 8,0%
Morgan Stanley PPE 3 310 3 850 4 260 4 703 5 182
Depreciation 187 204 216 228 242
% Depreciation/PPE(T-1) 6,2% 5,6% 5,4% 5,1%
2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
EBITDA Iberia 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
Thesis (Base Scenario) 474 489 502 512
Margin 8,0% 8,0% 8,1% 8,3%
Thesis (weighted Scenario) 440 441 453 461
Margin 7,5% 7,4% 7,6% 7,8%
Morgan Stanley 496 511 514 503
Margin 8,2% 8,0% 7,7% 7,3%
Variation -0,2 pp 0,0 pp 0,4 pp 1,0 pp
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Furthermore, fueled by the sales boost, the net working capital is expected to have a greater 
positive effect on the investment bank valuations. 
Additionally, the analyst considered an outflow of €160 million due to acquisitions in 2015 
while the master student assumed a smaller amount, €146 million. 
To summarize, Morgan Stanley’s analyst's reduced margins, delayed deprecations and higher 
investment rate result in a smaller free cash flow from 2017 until 2021 comparing to the 
thesis. Thereafter the continued increase of sales and the consequent positive affect from the 
working capital makes the analyst’s terminal cash flow significantly higher than the thesis’. 
Surprisingly, the sum of the explicit period cash flows is similar (Morgan Santley €1.677 vs 
thesis €1.707). 
 
Exhibit 54: Free cash flow comparison with Morgan Stanley. Source: Own estimations and Morgan 
Stanley report 
Moreover, the implied weighted average cost of capital on the weighted scenario model
84
 is 
6,5% for Iberia and 7,0% for the emerging markets which is considerably below the 8% 
considered by the investment bank.  In conclusion, Morgan Stanley assumed a higher rate of 
sales growth in Iberia, a margin decrease in Iberia, a significantly higher investment in capex, 
on average 20% higher, and a higher discount factor. These factors counterbalanced the 
higher EV adjustments and the lower terminal growth assumed by the master student. 
Therefore, the valuation of the investment banker is 35% below from the presented on this 
report. 
 
Exhibit 63: Share price comparison with Morgan Stanley. Source: Own estimations and Morgan Stanley 
report 
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 To compute the implied WACC the author used excel’s goal seek on the base scenario to access which 












2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e
Thesis Morgan Stanley
€ million Thesis Morgan Stanley Variation
Terminal Value (%) 0,9% 1,8% -0,9 pp
Enterprise Value 5 607 4 230 32,6%
EV adjustments 703 614 14,5%
Equity Value 4 904 3 616 35,6%
Price per Share (€) 7,6 5,6 35,7%
Terminal Value 4 196 3153 33,1%
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8. Conclusions 
The aim of this dissertation was to establish a fair price for Distribuidora Internacional de 
Alimentación share and consequently provide an investment recommendation. Taking the 
goal in consideration, the first step was to carefully study the most important valuation 
methods and its variables.  
The discount cash flow model and the relative valuation were the methods chosen to estimate 
DIA’s value. Furthermore, the sum of parts approach were used to evaluate the company’s 
business segments separately and alternative scenarios were constructed to incorporate 
macroeconomic risk.  
Furthermore, a deep understanding about the food retail market and its macroeconomic 
drivers was essential to set accurate forecasts.  
Taking everything in account, the author came up with a share price of €7,6 which implies a 
potential upside of 36% from the closing date on December 31, 2014. Therefore a buy 
recommendation was released.  
In addition, the author has the opinion that the market may be bearish regarding food retailers 
since its index is trading at seven year minimums and inflation in Europe is expected to start 
recovering in 2015.  
Finally, DIA seems to be undervalued in comparison with the market. Its multiples are trading 
at a small discount. Moreover, the author defends that DIA should be traded at a premium, 
based on the fact that historically the company has very resilient margins and has a good 
strategy to keep them in the future. In accordance, the market consensus rate DIA as “buy” 
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Appendix  
Appendix I: DIA top shareholders 
 
Source: DIA's report 
Appendix II: Spread 
To compute DIA’s spread the author made an average from the two tables below. It was used 
the credit rating of BBB- and the maturity of five years in accordance with the Euro bond 




Baillie Gifford & CO 8,06% Global Asset Management
Cervinia Europe 5,01% Owned by Groupe Arnault - Holding with diversified investments owned by Bernard Arnault 
Blue Partners 3,99% Owned by Colony Capital - Global real estate investment firm
Blackrock 3,01% Global Asset Management
Note: Data from the end of June 2014
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Source: http://www.bondsonline.com/Todays_Market/Corporate_Bond_Spreads.php 
Appendix III: European Central Bank – Reference rate for interest rates 
 
Source: Global rates 
 
Appendix IV: Macroeconomics 
DIA is present in five countries divided in two broad groups: Iberia, which includes Portugal 
and Spain; and emerging countries, including Argentina, Brazil and China. Therefore, the 
aim of this section is to analyze the macroeconomic environment, including the competition, 
















Feb-13 May-13 Aug-13 Nov-13 Feb-14 May-14 Aug-14 Nov-14
ECB reference rate (%)
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 Iberia 
Iberia is the most important segment for DIA’s operations, accounting for 66% of total sales 
and 86% of EBITDA during the first nine months of 2014. Moreover, Iberia is also the most 
profitable segment with an EBITDA margin close to 10%.  
Spain 
Spain is DIA’s home and major market. During the first nine months of 2014, the Spanish 
operation accounted for 86% of Iberia’s sales. Therefore, understanding the macroeconomic 
environment of Spain is essential for DIA’s valuation. 
Spain is the 5
th
 most populous country in the European Union with around 46,5 million
85
 
people in 2013. It is also the 5
th
 largest economy in terms of GDP
86
, being one of the most 
important European Union countries.  
After 2008, Spain suffered the longest recession in decades with its GDP contracting 3,8% in 
2009 and unemployment rising from 8,2%, before crisis, to 26,1% in 2013. The austerity 
measures, including the increase in VAT of basic food products
87
, together with the lower 
income, made clients become more price sensitive, pressing retailer’s prices down and 
avoiding buying large baskets in “one-stop” shopping therefore favoring proximity 
stores to buy the weekly or daily groceries. In consequence retail sales growth has been 
negative since 2009. 
 
Source: Focus economics 
Moreover with the reforms regarding labor flexibility, the restructure of the financial sector 
and the deleveraging of the private sector, the consumer confidence index improved and the 
GDP and employment started recover in 2013. However, Spain registered very low inflation, 
including deflation on the food prices index, particularly on fruits and vegetables which have 
a significance weight on DIA’s basket, negatively affecting the food retailer’s performance.  
                                                          
85
 Estimations from the IMF, 2013. 
86
 GDP = Gross Domestic Product. 
87
 The average basket of products VAT increased 25% from 8% to 10% and, in an attempt to maintain volumes, 
retailers tend assumed the tax burden at the expense of profit margins. 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Retail Sales (%) -5,6 -1,8 -5,8 -7,0 -4,0
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Source: OECD iLibrary 
It is also important to note that the GDP growth is driven by a recovery of the private 
consumption and a positive impact of exports which are dependent on the performance of 
Europe. 
 
Source: IMF forecasts 
Despite the positive outlook for the next years, with increasing GDP and improving 
employment rates, government debt is still at alarming levels, corresponding to 98,6% of 
GDP, and as such, a scenario of deeper food deflation and further austerity measures is still 
possible. This event would drag the economy, and consequently retailers, for more years of 
struggle. 
Regarding competition, the Spanish food retail market is widely dispersed and the top 5 
retailers account for 45% of the market. Mercadona is the market leader with €18.033
88
 
million sales, more than 1.500 stores and 22% market share, followed by Carrefour and DIA 
with market share around 8% each. However taking the acquisitions of El Árbol and Eroski 
stores into account, DIA becomes standalone on the second place. Furthermore the financial 
crisis was devastating for many small retailers and less profitable companies turning the food 
retail market a perfect place for consolidation. 
                                                          
88


































1Q 11 2Q 11 3Q 11 4Q 11 Q1 12 2Q 12 3Q 12 4Q 12 Q1 13 2Q 13 3Q 13 4Q 13 Q1 14 2Q 14 3Q 14
Food Inflation Spain Inflation Spain
Economic indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e
GDP Real (%) 3,5 0,9 -3,8 -0,2 0,1 -1,6 -1,2 1,3 1,7 1,8 1,8 1,9 2,0
GDP Nominal (%) 6,9 3,3 -3,8 -0,1 0,1 -1,6 -0,6 1,1 2,3 2,8 3,0 3,3 3,4
Inflation (%) 2,8 4,1 -0,2 2,0 3,1 2,4 1,5 0,0 0,6 0,9 1,0 1,3 1,3
Unemployment rate (%) 8,2 11,3 17,9 19,9 21,4 24,8 26,1 24,6 23,5 22,4 21,2 19,9 18,5
Population Growth (%) 2,0 1,7 0,8 0,4 0,4 0,1 -0,3 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,3 -0,3
Government Debt (% of GDP) 36,3 40,2 54,0 61,7 70,5 85,9 93,9 98,6 101,1 102,1 102,1 101,1 99,6
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Source: BPI Equity Research October 23, 2014 
 Portugal 
Portugal is substantially smaller comparing with Spain, both in terms of GDP (243,3 vs 1.389 
billion dollars
89
) and population (10,5 vs 46,5 million people
90
). Regarding its contribution to 
DIA, its 600 stores account for around 14% of Iberia’s sales.   
Similarly to what happened in Spain, Portugal also suffered a lot with the 2008 crisis. 
However Portugal felt deeper in recession and had to be bailed out by the IFM in 2011 due to 
the sovereign debt crisis.  
 
Source: OECD ILibrary 
Comparing to before crisis the government debt rose substantially to 131,1% of GDP in 2014, 
unemployment increased 860bp
91
 to 16,2% in 2013 and GDP decreased by -2,9% in 2009 and 
-3,2% in 2012. In order to reduce government spending and increase revenue, austerity 
                                                          
89
 Estimations from the CIA factbook, 2013. 
90
 Estimations from the IMF, 2013. 
91
 Bp=basis points; 100bp=1%. 









































1Q 11 2Q 11 3Q 11 4Q 11 Q1 12 2Q 12 3Q 12 4Q 12 Q1 13 2Q 13 3Q 13 4Q 13 Q1 14 2Q 14 3Q 14
Food Inflation Portugal Inflation Portugal
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measures were taken causing taxes to increase and pensions to decrease, making pressure to 
the household budget. 
With these adverse macroeconomic conditions Portuguese retail market as well as consumer 
confidence sharply decreased, and consumer habits changed. Similarly to what happened in 
Spain, clients started to favor proximity formats and became more price sensitive. In 
response, retailers invested substantially in private label products and aggressive promotion 
initiatives. These trends intensified following the 1
st
 of May 2012 when Pingo Doce, made a 





Source: Focus economics 
Portugal successfully got out of the IMF program on May 2014 and future projections imply a 
recovery of the Portuguese economy. The government interest rates have been decreasing, 
GDP is expected to increase due to internal demand, unemployment is expected to decrease 
and consumer confidence is increasing. However, Government’s debt is still at alarming 
levels and there is the risk of further deflation on consumer prices. Furthermore economic 
growth is highly dependent on the other European countries performance, particularly Spain 
which accounts for 23% of total exports. 
 
Source: IMF forecasts 
Moreover, in contrast with Spain, the Portuguese food retail market is highly concentrated 
with the top 5 retailers controlling 75% market share. However, the market is promotion 
driven and very competitive with the two main players, Sonae and Pingo Doce, detached from 
the others with more than 20% market share each, “fighting” for market share. DIA was 
negatively affected by tough market environment, facing competitors in price and proximity 




). It is expected weak 
                                                          
92
 EDLP = Everyday low price. It is a pricing strategy where the company offers low prices everyday and 
disregards promotions. 
93
 Meu Super is a Sonae’s franchise banner 
94
 Amanhecer is a partnership between Jeronimo Martins’ Cash&Carry, Recheio, and traditional stores 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Retail Sales (%) -1,9 -1,2 -8,1 -5,8 -1,5
Economic indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e
GDP Real (%) 2,4 0,0 -2,9 1,9 -1,3 -3,2 -1,4 1,0 1,5 1,7 1,8 1,8 1,8
GDP Nominal (%) 5,3 1,6 -2,0 2,6 -1,0 -3,5 0,4 1,7 2,5 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,7
Inflation (%) 2,4 2,7 -0,9 1,4 3,6 2,8 0,4 0,0 1,1 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5
Unemployment rate (%) 8,0 7,6 9,4 10,8 12,7 15,5 16,2 14,2 13,5 13,0 12,4 11,9 11,3
Population growth (%) 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0 -0,1 -0,4 -0,9 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Government Debt (% of GDP) 68,4 71,7 83,7 94,0 108,2 124,1 128,9 131,3 128,7 126,5 124,1 121,8 119,3
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Source: BPI Equity Research October 23, 2014 
 Emerging markets 
The second segment is the Emerging markets which correspond for 34% of total sales and has 
an EBITDA margin close to 3,0%. This segment has been growing exponentially albeit 
negative exchange rate effect in 2014.  
Emerging countries exposure carry additional risks but also new growth opportunities that 
developed countries lack.  
Moreover, it is important to note that emerging markets’ macroeconomic environment is 
much more volatile than Iberia’s and precise forecasts are difficult or impossible to access. 
Emerging countries, in general, experienced faster recovery from the financial crisis than 
developed countries. However current macroeconomic environment, namely declining 
commodity prices and the Chinese slowdown, is negatively affecting emerging countries 
exports, depreciating their currencies and threatening their growth. 
Moreover, in a market where traditional stores still dominate, the top five players account for 
approximately 25% of the market. Additionally, demographics and purchasing habits have 
been evolving as young and urban consumers move away from the traditional channel to 
favor convenience store formats in city centers. Furthermore, average disposal income has 
been increasing and second tier
96
 cities are growing leaving profitable opportunities for 
retailers. 
                                                          
95
 Source: BPI research report  
96
 Considered smaller and less important and usually have lower competition. 
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Finally joint ventures and franchising allow international players to have access the local 
market, namely to the local expertise and geographic particularities. 
Argentina 
Argentina is the third largest country in South America with a population of 41,5 million 
people
97
 and a GDP of 771 billion dollars
98
. 
In the first nine months of 2014, DIA’s operations in Argentina reached 765 million Euros in 
sales, accounting for 38,2% of emerging markets sales. Comparing with the first nine months 
of 2013 sales decreased by -1,7% due to negative exchange rate effect (growth of 54% in 
constant exchange rates).  evertheless, Argentina represents DIA’s fastest growing segment 




Source: Focus economics 
Historically, Argentina’s economic performance has been very volatile, suffering from 
recurring economic crisis and hyperinflation in some years and growing closely to double 
digit in others. A severe crisis hit Argentina in 2002 after the end of the peso’s 1-1 fixed 
exchange rate with the US dollar, with GDP falling at a double digit rate, inflation surpassing 
40% and almost 60% of Argentines were below the poverty line. After this crisis the GDP 
grew at an average of 8,5% per year and inflation ranged between 5% and 11% until the 2008 
financial crisis. Argentina had a fast recovery from the financial crisis growing 9,1% and 
8,6% in 2010 and 2011, respectively. 
 
Source: IMF forecasts 
Nowadays, despite of the Argentinean Peso’s devaluation by 20% and tightened monetary and 
fiscal policies, in the early 2014, Argentina is witnessing hyperinflation and negative growth. 
                                                          
97
 Estimations from the IMF, 2013. 
98
 Estimations from the CIA factbook, 2013. 
99
 In Euro values. 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
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Furthermore, the Argentinean government has restrictive currency exchanges controls which 
create a black market with deeply unfavorable rates. The cash restrictions should have a 
negative impact on DIA’s valuation, however, according to the company, all the money 
generated by the operations today is reinvested back in the business and it is expected this will 
continue so during the next years since DIA has an ambitious expansion plan in Argentina. 
Additionally, the IMF alerted for the possibility of the statistics provided by local 
institutions to be unreliable since private entities forecast high inflation and negative GDP 
evolution while government estimate positive GDP growth and smother levels of inflation. 
 
Source: IMF forecasts 
Although, the retail environment is still dominated by traditional stores, big international 
players such as Carrefour, Casino, Walmart and DIA are opening stores and grabbing market 
share.  
To summarize, the short term perspective is negative with hyperinflation, negative GDP 
growth and low business sentiment. The long perspective is blurred and the IMF doesn’t 
provide forecasts. To conclude, the risks of hyperinflation and depression will be properly 
incorporated on the cash flows of the business scenarios.  
Brazil 
Brazil is the largest country in South America in terms of population (201 million people
100
), 
area (8,5 million square km
101
) and GDP (2.416 trillion dollars
102
). Moreover, it is the main 
emerging country for DIA’s operations, accounting 55% of the segment’s total sales with a 
9% CAGR since 2010
103
. 
Brazil was one of the fastest countries to recover from the 2008 crisis with its real GDP 
growing at 7,5% in 2010. In contrast, the economy have been slowing down in the last years 
and, albeit historical minimum levels of unemployment,  Brazil is currently facing weak GDP 
growth, including two quarters of recession in 2014, and high inflation (6,5%), above the 
4,5% government’s target. 
                                                          
100
 Estimation from the IMF, 2013. 
101
 Estimation from the CIA factbook, 2013. 
102
 Estimation from the CIA factbook, 2013. 
103
 In Euro values. 
Economic indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e
GDP Real (%) 8,0 3,1 0,1 9,1 8,6 0,9 2,9 -1,7 -1,5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
GDP Nominal (%) 27,1 25,0 9,9 28,2 27,2 19,2 21,8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Inflation (%) 8,8 8,6 6,3 10,5 9,8 10,0 10,6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Unemployment rate (%) 8,5 7,9 8,7 7,8 7,2 7,2 7,1 8,8 9,0 9,2 9,4 10,0 10,3
Population growth (%) 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1
Note: "n.a." Means that the information is not available
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Source: OECD iLibrary 
In addition, on the last October 26, Dilma Rousself, from the workers’ party, was re-elected 
by the narrowest margin
104
, from her opponent, Aécio Neves. Markets were favoring a change 
of strategy and reacted negatively. The Bovespa index, Brazil’s main stock exchange, 
decreased by 2,8% and the Real, Brazilian currency, sank to its lowest value in nine years 
(2,52 against the U.S. dollar). 
Moreover, in order to ease the current inflation level the Brazilian central bank has been 
tighten the monetary policy by increasing the interest rate reference, SELIC, from 7,25% in 
April 2013 to 11,75% on the last update, 3
rd
 December of 2014. 
 
Source: Banco Central do Brazil 
In the long run, it is expected GDP to gradually increase to 3%, inflation to converge to the 
4,5% target and unemployment to stay at low levels (5,5%). 
 
Source: IMF forecasts 
                                                          
104
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Mar-13 Jun-13 Sep-13 Dec-13 Mar-14 Jun-14 Sep-14 Dec-14
Selic Rate (%)
Economic indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e
GDP Real (%) 6,1 5,2 -0,3 7,5 2,7 1,0 2,5 0,3 1,4 2,2 2,7 2,9 3,0
GDP Nominal (%) 12,3 13,9 6,8 16,4 9,9 6,0 10,3 5,7 6,6 7,3 7,8 8,0 8,2
Inflation (%) 3,6 5,7 4,9 5,0 6,6 5,4 6,2 6,3 5,9 5,6 5,0 4,6 4,5
Unemployment rate (%) 9,3 7,9 8,1 6,7 6,0 5,5 5,4 5,5 6,1 5,9 5,7 5,5 5,5
Population growth (%) 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,0 1,0 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,7 0,7
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Regarding the food retail market, DIA is the 5
th
 supermarket player with 1,4 billion Euros in 
sales in 2013, below the market leader Grupo Pão de Açucar with around 11 Billion Euros, its 
former “parent company” Carrefour, Walmart Brazil and Chilean Cencosud
105
.  
Moreover, Brazil has a large labor pool and it is expected that the growth of the middle class 
with higher disposable income will fuel convenient and discount formats. Furthermore most 
Brazilians are brand-oriented and therefore there is open space for private label penetration. 
 
Source: Focus economics 
Brazil is the 6
th
 most populous country in the world and each region can have the same size as 
a European country and has its particularities. Therefore a deep local analysis is essential for 
the success of the operations. In response, DIA has been adopting a cautions and sustainable 
growth strategy by entering in a new region with intervals of 18 months. 
To summarize, Brazil is facing headwinds in terms of exports, dependent on the Chinese 
economy (17% of total exports), GDP growth and inflation. Nevertheless, the tighter credit 
conditions are expected to ease inflation, and the historical minimum unemployment rate 
should have a positive impact on the medium to long term growth. 
China 
DIA’s operation in China are the smallest segment accounting for 6,3% of emerging markets 
sales and only 2,1% of total group’s sales, during the first nine months of 2014. 
China is the most populous country in the world with over one billion people and has been 
witnessing consistently double digit growth. It is the world’s largest manufacturer and 
exporter and it is estimated that every perceptual point of lower growth to have a significant 
impact on the world’s economy. Additionally, China has been gradually transforming itself 
into a market-based economy. 
 
Source: IMF forecasts 
For the future it is expected a gradual deceleration of the economy to sustainable levels, a 
stable inflation level at around 3% and unemployment rate constant at 4,1%. Furthermore, 
China is relatively dependent on Hong Kong and USA economies since together correspond 
                                                          
105
 According to the Brazilian magazine: Supermercado Moderno. 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Retail Sales (%) 5,9 10,9 6,6 8,4 4,3
Economic indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e
GDP Real (%) 14,2 9,6 9,2 10,4 9,3 7,7 7,7 7,4 7,1 6,8 6,6 6,4 6,3
GDP Nominal (%) 19,7 18,5 10,4 15,5 17,3 12,0 10,8 9,9 9,5 9,2 9,3 9,1 9,0
Inflation (%) 4,8 5,9 -0,7 3,3 5,4 2,6 2,6 2,3 2,5 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0
Unemployment rate (%) 4,0 4,2 4,3 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,1
Population growth (%) 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
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for 34,1% of its exports. The main economic risks are the over reliance on investment, 
especially on the property sector, and the highly indebted local governments. 
 
Source: OECD iLibrary 
The retail market in China has been growing at double digit rates due to increase in disposable 
income despite China’s slowdown. Moreover, Chinese are technology fans hence the online 
shopping is well developed. 
 
Source: Focus economics 
Furthermore it is expected healthy growth in grocery retailing driven by purchasing power 
evolution and further expansion of modern channels. 
The main international players are present in China namely Walmart, Carrefour, Tesco and 
Auchan, seeking growth opportunities, in a market where the top five retailers have a 
combined market share of only 5%.  
Finally, the main trends are: private label and convenience format penetration, more on-the-go 
meal services and partnership with online retailers to adapt the click and collect system. 



























Q1 12 2Q 12 3Q 12 4Q 12 Q1 13 2Q 13 3Q 13 4Q 13 Q1 14 2Q 14 3Q 14
Food Inflation China Inflation China 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Retail Sales (%) 15,5 18,4 17,1 14,3 13,1
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Source: Company data 
Appendix VI: Eroski and El Árbol 
 
Source: Company data and own estimations 
Appendix VII: Franchise 
 
Source: Own estimations 
Appendix VIII: Sales estimation tables 
The “estimation tables” were used to estimate sales. As both segments have different 
characteristics, different tables were used for Iberia and Emerging Markets. The Iberia 
estimation table includes two main drivers: Like-for-Like and Expansion. The first is the sum 
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2010 2011 2012 2013
Group incl. France Group excl. France
El Árbol Eroski
Amount invested (1) 125 146
Number of stores (2) 444 160
Net sales in 2013 (1) 825 443
EBITDA margin in 2013 (3) -0,6% 3,0%
Average selling area (Sqm) 700 800
Total area (Sqm) 310 800 128 000
Sales per Sqm 2 654 3 459
EV/Sales multiple 0,15 0,33
(1) In Mill ion Euros
(2) Eroski stores are subject of adjustments
(3) Estimatimations
Sqm = Square meters
COCO DIA DIA DIA DIA
COFO DIA Shared Franchise DIA
FOFO Franchise Shared Franchise DIA
Franchisee Support of an international retailer and opportunity to manage its own business;
DIA Lower cost base and operational flexibility;
Franchisee Contractual obligation to buy from DIA;
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of four variables: food inflation; cannibalization effect, forecasted to be equal to one third of 
openings; discount effect, since DIA aims to be the price leader company’s internal inflation 
should be lower than food inflation; and remodeling effect which corresponds to the increase 
in sales expected after a refurbishing process. Additionally, the remodeling effect is 
multiplied by a factor corresponding to the percentage of stores remodeled during the 
previous year. The expansion effect corresponds to the perceptual increment of new stores 
and it is multiplied by the factor of 50%, assuming that the stores are opened uniformly during 
the year. It was assumed the same growth for Eroski and El Árbol new stores and DIA’s 
original store network in Spain (Base Spain) with the exception of 2014 in which it is 
expected the two banners to perform worse than DIA established portfolio before being 
integrated. It is also important to note that in Portugal the macroeconomic environment is 
expected to be tougher mainly due to higher levels of competition and lower competitive 
advantage (compared to DIA’s position in Spain). This effect is reflected on the item 
“discount” once the company will have to invest a lot in prices to recover sales.  
Regarding Emerging Market the estimation table has three main variables: Like-for-Like; 
Expansion; and Exchange rate. The Like-for-Like performance is the sum of two variables: 
food inflation; and quantities which indicate if the company is growing faster than inflation; 
the GDP evolution and individual performance of the company were used to estimate this 
variable. 
Finally, all estimations were based on the IMF estimations and observation of the current 
market. 
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Projections 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Base Spain
Food inflation -4,0% -2,5% -0,5% 0,0% 0,5% 0,8% 1,0% 1,3% 1,3% 1,5% 1,5%
Canibalization -1,0% -0,8% -0,5% -0,5% -0,5% -0,3% -0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Discount -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0%
Remodelling 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 16,0% 16,0% 16,0% 16,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL -5,0% -3,4% -1,0% -0,5% -1,0% -0,5% -0,2% 0,3% 0,3% 0,5% 0,5%
Expansion 3,5% 2,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 1,8% 1,3% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Total Sales -3,3% -2,1% -0,3% 0,2% -0,3% 0,0% 0,1% 0,3% 0,3% 0,5% 0,5%
El Arbol
Food inflation -4,0% -2,5% -0,5% 0,0% 0,5% 0,8% 1,0% 1,3% 1,3% 1,5% 1,5%
Canibalization 0,0% -0,8% -0,5% -0,5% -0,5% -0,3% -0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Discount -3,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0%
Remodelling 0,0% 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 0,0% 33,0% 33,0% 33,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 0,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL -7,0% -3,4% -1,0% -0,5% -1,0% -0,5% -0,2% 0,3% 0,3% 0,5% 0,5%
Expansion -1,0% 2,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 100,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion -1,0% 1,3% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Total Sales -8,0% -2,1% -0,3% 0,2% -0,3% 0,0% 0,1% 0,3% 0,3% 0,5% 0,5%
Eroski
Food inflation -4,0% -2,5% -0,5% 0,0% 0,5% 0,8% 1,0% 1,3% 1,3% 1,5% 1,5%
Canibalization 0,0% -0,8% -0,5% -0,5% -0,5% -0,3% -0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Discount -3,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0%
Remodelling 0,0% 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 0,0% 33,0% 33,0% 33,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 0,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL -7,0% -3,4% -1,0% -0,5% -1,0% -0,5% -0,2% 0,3% 0,3% 0,5% 0,5%
Expansion 0,0% 2,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 0,0% 1,3% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Total Sales -7,0% -2,1% -0,3% 0,2% -0,3% 0,0% 0,1% 0,3% 0,3% 0,5% 0,5%
Clarel
Inflation 0,0% 0,6% 0,9% 1,0% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5%
Canibalization 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Extra 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 8,0% 8,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 4,0% 4,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL 4,0% 4,6% 0,9% 1,0% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5%
Expansion 8,5% 11,5% 10,5% 9,5% 8,0% 7,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 4,3% 5,8% 5,3% 4,8% 4,0% 3,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 0,0%
Total Sales 8,3% 10,4% 6,2% 5,8% 5,3% 4,8% 3,8% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 1,5%
Portugal
Food inflation -4,0% -2,5% -0,5% 0,0% 0,5% 0,8% 1,0% 1,3% 1,3% 1,5% 1,5%
Canibalization -1,0% -0,7% -0,5% -0,5% -0,3% -0,2% -0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Discount -5,0% -4,0% -3,0% -2,0% -1,5% -1,5% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0%
Remodelling 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 16,0% 16,0% 16,0% 16,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL -9,0% -6,2% -3,0% -1,5% -1,3% -0,9% -0,2% 0,3% 0,3% 0,5% 0,5%
Expansion 3,0% 2,0% 1,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 1,5% 1,0% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Total Sales -7,5% -5,2% -2,3% -0,8% -0,8% -0,6% 0,1% 0,3% 0,3% 0,5% 0,5%
Base Scenario
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Projections 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Base Spain
Food inflation -4,0% -5,0% -4,0% -3,0% -1,0% 0,0% 0,5% 0,8% 1,0% 1,2% 1,5%
Canibalization -1,0% -0,5% -0,5% -0,5% -0,3% -0,2% -0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Discount -1,0% -3,0% -3,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0%
Remodelling 6,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 16,0% 16,0% 16,0% 16,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 1,0% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL -5,0% -8,0% -7,0% -4,0% -2,3% -1,2% -0,7% -0,2% 0,0% 0,2% 0,5%
Expansion 2,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 1,3% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Total Sales -3,8% -7,3% -6,3% -3,3% -1,8% -0,9% -0,4% -0,2% 0,0% 0,2% 0,5%
El Arbol
Food inflation -4,0% -5,0% -4,0% -3,0% -1,0% 0,0% 0,5% 0,8% 1,0% 1,2% 1,5%
Canibalization 0,0% -0,5% -0,5% -0,5% -0,3% -0,2% -0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Discount -3,0% -3,0% -3,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0%
Remodelling 0,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 0,0% 33,0% 33,0% 33,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 0,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL -7,0% -8,5% -7,5% -4,5% -2,3% -1,2% -0,7% -0,2% 0,0% 0,2% 0,5%
Expansion -1,0% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 100,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion -1,0% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Total Sales -8,0% -6,8% -5,8% -2,8% -1,8% -0,9% -0,4% -0,2% 0,0% 0,2% 0,5%
Eroski
Food inflation -4,0% -5,0% -4,0% -3,0% -1,0% 0,0% 0,5% 0,8% 1,0% 1,2% 1,5%
Canibalization 0,0% -0,5% -0,5% -0,5% -0,3% -0,2% -0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Discount -3,0% -3,0% -3,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0%
Remodelling 0,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 0,0% 33,0% 33,0% 33,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 0,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL -7,0% -8,5% -7,5% -4,5% -2,3% -1,2% -0,7% -0,2% 0,0% 0,2% 0,5%
Expansion 0,0% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 0,0% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Total Sales -7,0% -6,8% -5,8% -2,8% -1,8% -0,9% -0,4% -0,2% 0,0% 0,2% 0,5%
Clarel
Inflation 0,0% 0,0% 0,5% 0,5% 0,7% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,2% 1,5%
Canibalization 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Extra 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 8,0% 5,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 4,0% 2,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL 4,0% 2,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,7% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,2% 1,5%
Expansion 8,5% 11,5% 10,5% 9,5% 8,0% 7,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 4,3% 5,8% 5,3% 4,8% 4,0% 3,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 0,0%
Total Sales 8,3% 8,3% 5,8% 5,3% 4,7% 4,5% 3,5% 3,5% 3,5% 3,7% 1,5%
Portugal
Food inflation -4,0% -5,0% -4,0% -3,0% -1,0% 0,5% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,2% 1,5%
Canibalization -0,8% -0,5% -0,5% -0,5% -0,3% -0,2% -0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Discount -5,0% -7,0% -4,0% -3,0% -2,0% -2,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0%
Remodelling 6,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 16,0% 16,0% 16,0% 16,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Remodelling 1,0% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL -8,9% -12,0% -8,0% -6,0% -3,3% -1,7% -0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,5%
Expansion 2,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 1,3% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Total Sales -7,6% -11,3% -7,3% -5,3% -2,8% -1,4% 0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,5%
Deflationary Scenario
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Projections 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Argentina
Food inflation 30,0% 20,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 8,0% 8,0% 8,0% 8,0% 8,0%
Extra 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL 31,0% 21,0% 11,0% 11,0% 11,0% 11,0% 9,0% 9,0% 9,0% 8,0% 8,0%
Expansion 12,0% 12,0% 12,0% 10,0% 10,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 2,0% 2,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 5,0% 5,0% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0%
Germany's inflation 0,9% 1,2% 1,5% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Exchange rate -36,5% -24,0% -8,5% -8,3% -8,3% -8,3% -6,3% -6,3% -6,0% -6,0% -6,0%
Total Sales 0,5% 3,0% 8,5% 7,7% 7,7% 5,2% 5,2% 5,2% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0%
Brazil
Food inflation 8,0% 7,5% 7,0% 6,5% 6,0% 5,5% 5,5% 5,5% 5,5% 5,0% 5,0%
Extra 0,0% 2,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 2,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL 8,0% 9,5% 10,0% 9,5% 9,0% 8,5% 8,5% 7,5% 6,5% 5,0% 5,0%
Expansion 16,0% 16,0% 15,0% 15,0% 10,0% 10,0% 5,0% 5,0% 2,0% 2,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 8,0% 8,0% 7,5% 7,5% 5,0% 5,0% 2,5% 2,5% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0%
Germany's inflation 0,9% 1,2% 1,5% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Exchange rate -12,0% -6,3% -5,5% -4,8% -4,3% -3,8% -3,8% -3,8% -3,5% -3,0% -3,0%
Total Sales 4,0% 11,2% 12,0% 12,2% 9,7% 9,7% 7,2% 6,2% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0%
China
Food inflation 3,5% 3,5% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0%
Extra 0,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL 3,5% 6,5% 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0% 3,0%
Expansion 12,0% 15,0% 15,0% 10,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 2,0% 2,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 6,0% 7,5% 7,5% 5,0% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0%
Germany's inflation 0,9% 1,2% 1,5% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Exchange rate -5,0% -2,3% -1,5% -1,3% -1,3% -1,3% -1,3% -1,3% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0%
Total Sales 4,5% 11,7% 12,0% 9,7% 7,2% 5,2% 5,2% 5,2% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0%
Base Scenario
Projections 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Argentina
Food inflation 30,0% 35,0% 35,0% 20,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 8,0% 8,0% 8,0%
Extra 1,0% -2,0% -2,0% -1,0% 0,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL 31,0% 33,0% 33,0% 19,0% 10,0% 11,0% 11,0% 11,0% 9,0% 8,0% 8,0%
Expansion 12,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 15,0% 15,0% 10,0% 5,0% 2,0% 2,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 6,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 7,5% 7,5% 5,0% 2,5% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0%
Germany's inflation 0,9% 1,2% 1,5% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Exchange rate -36,5% -42,0% -42,0% -24,0% -8,3% -8,3% -8,3% -8,3% -6,0% -6,0% -6,0%
Total Sales 0,5% -4,0% -4,0% 0,0% 9,2% 10,2% 7,7% 5,2% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0%
Brazil
Food inflation 8,0% 25,0% 25,0% 10,0% 6,0% 5,5% 5,5% 5,5% 5,5% 5,5% 5,0%
Extra 0,0% -2,0% -1,0% 1,0% 2,0% 2,0% 1,0% 0,5% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL 8,0% 23,0% 24,0% 11,0% 8,0% 7,5% 6,5% 6,0% 6,0% 5,5% 5,0%
Expansion 16,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 5,0% 5,0% 2,0% 2,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 8,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 2,5% 2,5% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0%
Germany's inflation 0,9% 1,2% 1,5% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Exchange rate -12,0% -30,0% -30,0% -8,3% -4,3% -3,8% -3,8% -3,8% -3,5% -3,5% -3,0%
Total Sales 4,0% -2,0% -1,0% 7,7% 8,7% 8,7% 5,2% 4,7% 3,5% 3,0% 2,0%
China
Food inflation 3,5% 16,0% 16,0% 5,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0%
Extra 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,0% 2,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0% 0,0%
LFL 3,5% 16,0% 16,0% 6,0% 5,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0% 3,0%
Expansion 12,0% 7,5% 7,5% 10,0% 10,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 2,0% 2,0% 0,0%
Factor 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Expansion 6,0% 3,8% 3,8% 5,0% 5,0% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 1,0% 1,0% 0,0%
Germany's inflation 0,9% 1,2% 1,5% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Exchange rate -5,0% -19,2% -19,2% -3,3% -1,3% -1,3% -1,3% -1,3% -1,0% -1,0% -1,0%
Total Sales 4,5% 0,6% 0,6% 7,7% 8,7% 5,2% 5,2% 5,2% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0%
Hyperinflation and Recession Scenario
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Appendix IX: Opex 
 
Source: Company data and own estimations 
Appendix X: Capex and depreciations 
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Appendix XI: Deflation news 
 





Rd 2,3% Risk free + Spread
Rf 0,7% German 10 years bond 27 Oct 2014
Beta 1,1 5 anos weekly MSCI Europe index






Benchmark Period (years) Frequency Beta
IBEX 35 2 Weekly 0,9
IBEX 35 5 Weekly 0,8
IBEX 35 2 Monthly 1,0
IBEX 35 5 Monthly 0,6
MSCI World Index 2 Weekly 1,3
MSCI World Index 5 Weekly 1,1
MSCI World Index 2 Monthly 1,4
MSCI World Index 5 Monthly 0,8
MSCI Europe Index 2 Weekly 1,2
MSCI Europe Index 5 Weekly 1,1
MSCI Europe Index 2 Monthly 1,5
MSCI Europe Index 5 Monthly 0,9
Beta
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€ million 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Goodwill 414 417 423 454 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308
Net property plant and equipment 1 597 1 626 1 619 1 602 1 357 1 653 1 788 1 901 2 003 2 091 2 167 2 224 2 271 2 297 2 297
Cash & cash equivalents 317 290 350 262 370 263 264 276 270 298 348 421 500 600 711
Inventory 539 522 527 545 429 489 516 536 554 571 587 603 616 626 634
Trade receivables 179 191 180 210 215 244 258 268 276 285 293 301 307 313 316
Other assets 206 264 306 298 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378
Assets available for sale 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Assets 3 253 3 310 3 405 3 371 3 057 3 336 3 512 3 668 3 790 3 931 4 082 4 236 4 380 4 523 4 645
Financial dept 569 866 980 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913
Trade payables 1 726 1 780 1 759 1 787 1 418 1 616 1 707 1 773 1 831 1 889 1 941 1 994 2 035 2 070 2 095
Provisions 184 169 101 81 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Other liabilities 352 390 418 406 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309
Liabilities associated with asset held for sale 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Liabilities 2 831 3 205 3 257 3 187 2 701 2 899 2 990 3 056 3 114 3 172 3 224 3 277 3 318 3 353 3 378
Total Equity 423 105 148 184 356 437 522 612 676 760 858 959 1 063 1 170 1 267
Retained earnings 184 356 437 522 612 676 760 858 959 1 063 1 170
Net profit 276 194 203 216 264 282 309 333 353 372 377
Dividends -103 -112 -118 -127 -199 -198 -211 -232 -250 -265 -279
Total Liabilities & Shareholders Funds 3 253 3 310 3 405 3 371 3 057 3 336 3 513 3 668 3 790 3 932 4 082 4 237 4 381 4 523 4 646
Base Scenario
€ million 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Sales 9 588 9 729 9 708 9 844 7 838 8 906 9 411 9 775 10 092 10 411 10 700 10 993 11 217 11 411 11 549
% gowth 1,5% -0,2% 1,4% -20,4% 13,6% 5,7% 3,9% 3,2% 3,2% 2,8% 2,7% 2,0% 1,7% 1,2%
p.m. Iberia 4 938 4 947 5 117 5 284 5 106 5 953 6 142 6 166 6 165 6 176 6 194 6 226 6 259 6 305 6 340
% gowth 0,2% 3,4% 3,3% -3,4% 16,6% 3,2% 0,4% 0,0% 0,2% 0,3% 0,5% 0,5% 0,7% 0,6%
p.m. Emerging markets 1 750 2 013 2 450 2 662 2 732 2 953 3 269 3 609 3 927 4 235 4 506 4 767 4 958 5 106 5 208
% gowth 15,0% 21,8% 8,6% 2,6% 8,1% 10,7% 10,4% 8,8% 7,8% 6,4% 5,8% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0%
Gross Profit 2 051 2 091 2 085 2 166 1 709 1 924 2 033 2 111 2 180 2 249 2 311 2 375 2 423 2 465 2 495
% of Sales 21,4% 21,5% 21,5% 22,0% 21,8% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6%
EBITDA 507 561 615 642 577 566 593 621 646 678 724 763 796 827 835
% of Sales 5,3% 5,8% 6,3% 6,5% 7,4% 6,3% 6,3% 6,4% 6,4% 6,5% 6,8% 6,9% 7,1% 7,2% 7,2%
p.m. Iberia 375 414 457 505 495 474 489 502 512 530 553 573 588 597 603
% of Sales 7,6% 8,4% 8,9% 9,6% 9,7% 8,0% 8,0% 8,1% 8,3% 8,6% 8,9% 9,2% 9,4% 9,5% 9,5%
p.m. Emerging markets 36 59 65 77 82 92 105 119 134 148 171 191 208 230 232
% of Sales 2,1% 2,9% 2,7% 2,9% 3,0% 3,1% 3,2% 3,3% 3,4% 3,5% 3,8% 4,0% 4,2% 4,5% 4,5%
EBIT 231 292 347 375 377 342 346 364 379 403 442 475 504 531 537
% of Sales 2,4% 3,0% 3,6% 3,8% 4,8% 3,8% 3,7% 3,7% 3,8% 3,9% 4,1% 4,3% 4,5% 4,7% 4,6%
p.m. Iberia 214 256 300 352 335 304 303 314 321 337 359 378 393 402 407
% of Sales 4,3% 5,2% 5,9% 6,7% 6,6% 5,1% 4,9% 5,1% 5,2% 5,5% 5,8% 6,1% 6,3% 6,4% 6,4%
p.m. Emerging markets 3 24 33 40 42 38 43 50 57 66 83 98 111 129 130
% of Sales 0,2% 1,2% 1,4% 1,5% 1,5% 1,3% 1,3% 1,4% 1,5% 1,6% 1,8% 2,0% 2,2% 2,5% 2,5%
Associated companies -1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial results -13 -35 -26 -40 -40 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21
Non-recurring items -93 -75 -38 -49 -50 -50 -50 -50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBT 125 182 283 286 287 272 276 293 358 383 421 455 483 510 516
Taxes -87 -83 -102 -96 -87 -78 -72 -77 -94 -101 -112 -121 -130 -138 -139
Net Profit (from continuing operations) 38 99 182 191 200 194 203 216 264 282 309 333 353 372 377
Income from discontinued operations -5 -35 5 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minority interest 4 12 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Profit Attributable to the Company 38 99 158 209 276 194 203 216 264 282 309 333 353 372 377
Underlying Net Profit 137 159 204 228 250 244 253 266 264 282 309 333 353 372 377
Underlying EPS 0,387 0,378 0,393 0,412 0,409 0,436 0,479 0,516 0,548 0,577 0,583
% growth -2,4% 4,0% 4,9% -0,7% 6,7% 9,8% 7,7% 6,1% 5,3% 1,2%
Dividend payout ratio 46% 41% 45% 45% 49% 50% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75%
Dividend 72,5 83,9 103,4 112,4 118,2 126,7 199,4 198,0 211,3 232,0 249,9 265,1 279,3 282,5
Dividend per share 0,11 0,13 0,16 0,17 0,18 0,20 0,31 0,31 0,33 0,36 0,39 0,41 0,43 0,44
% growth 15,7% 23,2% 8,7% 5,2% 7,2% 57,4% -0,7% 6,7% 9,8% 7,7% 6,1% 5,3% 1,2%
Base Scenario
€ million 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
EBT 287 272 276 293 358 383 421 455 483 510 516
Capex -325 -374 -381 -371 -369 -362 -358 -345 -339 -323 -298
Depreciations 200 223 247 258 267 275 282 288 293 296 298
Working capital -258 108 50 36 31 32 29 29 22 19 14
Tax -87 -78 -72 -77 -94 -101 -112 -121 -130 -138 -139
Dividend -103 -112 -118 -127 -199 -198 -211 -232 -250 -265 -279
Acquisition El Arbol -125
Acquisition Eroski -146
Cash from DIA France 645
Others -125
Financing needs / surplus 108 -107 1 12 -6 28 51 73 79 100 111
Cash T-1 262 370 263 264 276 270 298 348 421 500 600
Cash T 370 263 264 276 270 298 348 421 500 600 711
Base Scenario
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€ million 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Goodwill 414 417 423 454 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308
Net property plant and equipment 1 597 1 626 1 619 1 602 1 357 1 639 1 757 1 864 1 968 2 060 2 132 2 186 2 228 2 254 2 254
Cash & cash equivalents 317 290 350 262 370 259 264 264 294 309 352 418 492 581 683
Inventory 539 522 527 545 429 479 490 502 516 531 545 558 569 578 585
Trade receivables 179 191 180 210 215 239 244 250 257 265 272 278 283 288 291
Other assets 206 264 306 298 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378
Assets available for sale 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Assets 3 253 3 310 3 405 3 371 3 057 3 302 3 442 3 565 3 721 3 852 3 987 4 126 4 258 4 387 4 500
Financial dept 569 866 980 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 913
Trade payables 1 726 1 780 1 759 1 787 1 418 1 616 1 707 1 773 1 831 1 889 1 941 1 994 2 035 2 070 2 095
Provisions 184 169 101 81 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Other liabilities 352 390 418 406 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309
Liabilities associated with asset held for sale 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Liabilities 2 831 3 205 3 257 3 187 2 701 2 899 2 990 3 056 3 114 3 172 3 224 3 277 3 318 3 353 3 378
Total Equity 423 105 148 184 355 404 452 509 608 680 764 849 941 1 034 1 122
Retained earnings 184 355 404 452 509 608 680 764 849 941 1 034
Net profit 275 160 155 166 213 233 258 279 301 319 327
Dividends -103 -112 -107 -109 -115 -160 -174 -193 -209 -226 -239
Total Liabilities & Shareholders Funds 3 253 3 310 3 405 3 371 3 057 3 302 3 442 3 565 3 722 3 852 3 988 4 127 4 259 4 388 4 500
Weigthed Scenario
€ million 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
Sales 9 588 9 729 9 708 9 844 7 833 8 718 8 909 9 120 9 379 9 666 9 913 10 153 10 344 10 514 10 638
% gowth 1,5% -0,2% 1,4% -20,4% 11,3% 2,2% 2,4% 2,8% 3,1% 2,6% 2,4% 1,9% 1,6% 1,2%
p.m. Iberia 4 938 4 947 5 117 5 284 5 100 5 912 5 971 5 949 5 928 5 928 5 940 5 965 5 993 6 033 6 067
% gowth 0,2% 3,4% 3,3% -3,5% 15,9% 1,0% -0,4% -0,4% 0,0% 0,2% 0,4% 0,5% 0,7% 0,6%
p.m. Emerging markets 1 750 2 013 2 450 2 662 2 732 2 807 2 938 3 171 3 451 3 739 3 973 4 188 4 351 4 481 4 571
% gowth 15,0% 21,8% 8,6% 2,6% 2,7% 4,7% 7,9% 8,8% 8,3% 6,3% 5,4% 3,9% 3,0% 2,0%
Gross Profit 2 051 2 091 2 085 2 166 1 708 1 883 1 924 1 970 2 026 2 088 2 141 2 193 2 234 2 271 2 298
% of Sales 21,4% 21,5% 21,5% 22,0% 21,8% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6% 21,6%
EBITDA 507 561 615 642 576 518 526 551 573 608 650 685 720 749 762
% of Sales 5,3% 5,8% 6,3% 6,5% 7,4% 5,9% 5,9% 6,0% 6,1% 6,3% 6,6% 6,7% 7,0% 7,1% 7,2%
p.m. Iberia 375 414 457 505 494 440 441 453 461 482 507 526 546 557 563
% of Sales 7,6% 8,4% 8,9% 9,6% 9,7% 7,5% 7,4% 7,6% 7,8% 8,1% 8,5% 8,8% 9,1% 9,2% 9,3%
p.m. Emerging markets 36 59 65 77 82 78 85 98 111 126 142 159 173 192 199
% of Sales 2,1% 2,9% 2,7% 2,9% 3,0% 2,8% 2,9% 3,1% 3,2% 3,4% 3,6% 3,8% 4,0% 4,3% 4,3%
EBIT 231 292 347 375 376 295 280 295 309 336 370 400 430 456 467
% of Sales 2,4% 3,0% 3,6% 3,8% 4,8% 3,4% 3,1% 3,2% 3,3% 3,5% 3,7% 3,9% 4,2% 4,3% 4,4%
p.m. Iberia 214 256 300 352 334 271 256 264 271 289 313 332 351 361 367
% of Sales 4,3% 5,2% 5,9% 6,7% 6,6% 4,6% 4,3% 4,4% 4,6% 4,9% 5,3% 5,6% 5,9% 6,0% 6,1%
p.m. Emerging markets 3 24 33 40 42 24 25 31 38 47 57 68 79 95 100
% of Sales 0,2% 1,2% 1,4% 1,5% 1,5% 0,9% 0,8% 1,0% 1,1% 1,2% 1,4% 1,6% 1,8% 2,1% 2,2%
Associated companies -1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial results -13 -35 -26 -40 -40 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21
Non-recurring items -93 -75 -38 -49 -50 -50 -50 -50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBT 125 182 283 286 286 224 210 225 288 315 350 379 410 436 446
Taxes -87 -83 -102 -96 -87 -64 -54 -59 -75 -82 -92 -100 -109 -117 -120
Net Profit (from continuing operations) 38 99 182 191 199 160 155 166 213 233 258 279 301 319 327
Income from discontinued operations -5 -35 5 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minority interest 4 12 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Profit Attributable to the Company 38 99 158 209 275 160 155 166 213 233 258 279 301 319 327
Underlying Net Profit 137 159 204 228 249 210 205 216 213 233 258 279 301 319 327
Weigthed Scenario
€ million 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e
EBT 286 224 210 225 288 315 350 379 410 436 446
Capex -325 -360 -364 -362 -368 -364 -352 -339 -331 -319 -295
Depreciations 200 223 246 255 264 272 279 285 289 293 295
Working Capital -257 123 76 49 36 34 32 33 25 21 15
Tax -87 -64 -54 -59 -75 -82 -92 -100 -109 -117 -120
Dividend -103 -112 -107 -109 -115 -160 -174 -193 -209 -226 -239
Acquisition El Arbol -125
Acquisition Eroski -146
Cash from DIA France 645
Others -125
Financing needs / Surplus 108 -112 6 -1 30 15 43 65 75 89 102
Cash T-1 262 370 259 264 264 294 309 352 418 492 581
Cash T 370 259 264 264 294 309 352 418 492 581 683
Weigthed Scenario
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Appendix XIV: DIA France impact 
 
Source: DIA France balance sheet - DIA’s first semester report 
The above DIA France balance sheet was used in order to adjust the 2014 consolidate 
balance sheet (excluding DIA France). For this purpose the amount of tangible assets, €494 
million, was subtracted on the property plant and equipment, the amount of Goodwill, €146 
million, was subtracted to goodwill and the following items: “other intangible assets”, 
“investment in companies consolidate by equity method”, “other non-current financial 
assets”, “current assets”, “other current financial assets” and “other assets”; were subtracted 
on “other assets” in the model. Furthermore, provisions amounting €20 million, were 
subtracted on group provisions, and the following items were subtracted on “other liabilities”: 
“deferred tax liabilities”, “current income tax liabilities”, “taxes payable to the tax office due 
to income tax” and “other financial liabilities”.  
 
Source: Deferred tax assets - DIA’s first semester report 
Furthermore a deferred tax asset amounting €145 million, due to DIA France, was added to 
“other assets”. 
Cash flow statement: in order to match assets with liabilities plus equity, €125 million had to 
be added, on “others” in 2014, due to lack of information regarding the complete impact of 
DIA France. 
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Income statement: the value of €76 million was imputed in the line “income from 
discontinued operations” due to DIA France sale. Due to lack of information, the value from 
the nine months report was used as an approximation for the year end. 
Appendix XV: Multiples 
 
Note: The indicators were extracted from Bloomberg on the 2
nd
 of January 2015, using the fiscal years of 2014 
and 2015 and Bloomberg’s analyst panel consensus. 
Note: LTG EPS mean long term earnings per share forecasted by Bloomberg for the next business cycle 
(between 3 and 5 years) 
(1) Casino group and CIA (Companhia Brasileira de Distribuição) were excluded because almost 50% of 
their sales don’t correspond to food retail business. 
(2) Magnit and O’key group were excluded because they only operate in Russia. 
(3) Tesco was excluded because of the recent accounting fraud. 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Store Format: Number of:
Convenience/Discount Yes
DIA 0,9 12,0 17,5 25,7 7,2
Ahold 3,4 Yes 10,9 Yes 11,8 Yes 24,6 Yes 6,4 Yes No No 5 Yes
Casino Group 18,7 No 6,4 Yes 6,8 No 48,3 No 6,7 Yes No Yes 3 No (1)
Jerónimo Martins 10,8 No -0,9 No 17,9 Yes 12,6 No 5,9 No Yes Yes 3 Yes
Sonae 1,0 Yes 0,0 No 0,0 No 52,3 No 7,9 Yes No No 2 No
X5 15,2 No 19,3 No 9,9 No 38,2 No 7,5 Yes No No 1 No
Delhaize 0,4 Yes 7,0 Yes 4,3 No 36,0 No 6,1 No No No 2 No
Kesko 2,1 Yes 0,0 No 8,4 No 15,4 No 4,2 No No No 1 No
Colruyt 5,9 No 4,2 No 17,8 Yes 0,7 No 8,0 Yes Yes No 3 Yes
WM Morrisson 2,4 Yes -3,9 No 0,0 No 40,0 No 6,6 Yes No No 2 No
Sainsbury 4,3 Yes -11,7 No 9,0 No 47,8 No 5,9 No No No 1 No
AxFood 3,1 Yes 0,0 No 28,3 No 2,3 No 5,6 No No No 1 No
Dixy 41,5 No 29,9 No 10,2 No 39,8 No 7,3 Yes Yes No 2 No
Magnit 33,1 No 17,5 Yes 20,3 Yes 7,0 No 11,4 No Yes No 3 No (2)
Carrefour -2,3 Yes 14,8 Yes 5,9 No 55,6 No 5,1 No No Yes 3 Yes
Tesco 1,7 Yes 5,3 No 9,1 No 57,4 No 7,5 Yes No Yes 3 No (3)
Metro Ag -1,5 Yes 0,0 No 3,1 No 54,7 No 4,4 No No Yes 2 No
CIA Brasileira 22,6 No 19,6 No 11,0 Yes 29,1 Yes 7,9 Yes No No 3 No (1)
BIM 21,7 No 0,0 No 0,0 No 0,1 No 4,6 No Yes No 1 No
O'key Group 19,2 No 9,4 Yes 16,5 Yes 30,4 Yes 7,8 Yes No No 4 No (2)
Pick n Pay 7,2 No 0,0 No 25,7 No 4,3 No 3,1 No No No 0 No
Organizacion Soriana 3,9 Yes 4,1 No 6,1 No 4,5 No 7,0 Yes No No 2 No
Cencosud 18,7 No 24,0 No 6,0 No 43,0 No 6,9 Yes No No 1 No
Peer?Name
CAGR Sales 3 years 
(%)















2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
DIA Ahold Jerónimo Martins Colruyt Carrefour
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Appendix XVI: Food retail index 
Source: Bloomberg 
Appendix XVII: Analysts recommendations 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Note: the recommendation consensus is a Bloomberg scale which ranges between 1 and 5 being “1” = 
Sell and “5” = Buy. As it can be seen in the table above DIA has the fifth highest recommendation 
level among the 23 players, with a recommendation of 4. 




















Casino Group 30,4% 3,4













Metro Ag 41,7% 3,6
CIA Brasileira 64,7% 4,3
BIM 16,7% 2,8
O'key Group 23,8% 2,9
Pick n Pay 37,5% 2,9
Organizacion Soriana 14,3% 2,1
Cencosud 19,0% 2,9
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